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ADDRESSING GAPS IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT: DIRECTORS'
RISK MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT OBLIGATIONS
Kristin N. Johnson*
In the years leading to the recent financial crisis, finance theorists introduced in-
novative methods, including quantitative financial models and derivative
instruments, to measure and mitigate risk exposure. During the financial crisis,
financial institutions facing insolvency revealed pervasive misunderstandings,
misapplications, and mistaken assumptions regarding these complex risk man-
agement methods. As losses in financial markets escalated and caused liquidity
and solvency crises, commentators sharply criticized directors and executives at
large financial institutions for their risk management decisions.
By adopting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Congress directly and indirectly addresses certain risk management oversight con-
cerns at large, complex financial institutions. To improve risk management
oversight at these institutions, Congress imposed several structural reforms altering
the composition and obligations of financial institutions' boards of directors. Un-
fortunately, even after the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act reforms, financial
institutions remain vulnerable to the same critical errors in enterprise risk man-
agement oversight that engendered systemic risk concerns during the recent
financial crisis.
While the Dodd-Frank Act may enhance a board's risk management oversight ca-
pabilities, significant concerns persist regarding reliance on board committees.
Organizational literature suggests that cognitive biases and structural limitations
that influence group decision making will continue to plague boards' efforts to ef-
fectively manage risk. This Article argues that better-tailored reforms are necessary
to address weaknesses in enterprise risk management regulation and to reduce the
threat of systemic risk.
Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, J.D. University of
Michigan Law School, B.S. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. I ex-
tend gracious thanks to Rachel Godsil, Frank Partnoy, Myriam Giles, Timothy Glynn, Cheryl
Wade, Elizabeth Nowicki, Cheryl Andrews, and Omari Simmons for their reflections or
comments on earlier drafts. All errors are my own.
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"Too many . . . acted recklessly, taking on too much risk . . . . Like
Icarus, they neverfeared flying ever closer to the sun."'
"All the incentives--profits, compensation, glory, even job security-
went in the direction of taking more and more risk, even if you half
suspected it would end badly."
INTRODUCTION
Financial institutions' business models often entail complex
lending, underwriting and securitization arrangements, complicat-
ed investments, and structured finance products. Artful navigation
of the risks inherent in these financial market activities may lead to
significant financial rewards. However, failing to adopt risk over-
sight policies that adequately identify, monitor, and manage risk
exposure related to these activities may lead to devastating losses.
Success in financial markets rests, in large part, on the adoption
and enforcement of effective risk management strategies.
Directors and executive officers of large, complex financial insti-
tutions are tasked with managing the risk exposure that these
sophisticated transactions create.3 Similar to other publicly-traded
corporations, the governance structure of financial institutions is
characterized by the separation of ownership and control. An
elected board of directors comprised of professionals (presumably
with relevant expertise) manages the business on behalf of a large
body of diverse and geographically dispersed shareholders.
State law and courts have long recognized the authority of cor-
porate directors to manage the internal affairs of corporations.
Moreover, state courts and legislatures accord significant deference
to corporate managers' decisions regarding internal affairs, includ-
ing managers' decisions related to risk taking and risk
management.' However, deferring to the directors and executive
officers neglects a critical conflict that illustrates the classic agency
problem.
Most public corporations compensate directors by granting
them equity shares. Directors who are employees and serve as ex-
1. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND EcON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011) at xviii-xix, available at http://www.fcic.gov/report [hereinafter
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT]. See also DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDA-
MENTAL FLAws IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 3 (2005).
2. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 2, 2009, (Magazine), at MM24.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See id.
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ecutive officers receive options to purchase equity shares as part of
their incentive-based compensation arrangements. Equity awards
are often based on the valuation of the company's stock or the
price at which the company's shares trade on a national exchange.
Rewarding directors and executives equity compensation presuma-
bly discourages the predilection to shirk or steal from the company.
This approach may also encourage managers to promote risk-taking
practices that lead to short-term increases in the company's stock
price at the expense of the company's long-term stability.
Because the conflicts created by equity compensation offer an ideal
illustration of agency costs and because the anecdotes involving exor-
bitant compensation awards often involve salacious scandals, a robust
literature has emerged exploring solutions to managers' conflicts of
interest related to compensation structures. The prevailing view sug-
gests that reforming the conflicts that relate to executive
compensation awards and risk taking will reduce managers' incentives
to engage in undesirable risk-taking and, consequently, reduce sys-
temic risk.
For the last several years, domestic and international authorities
have dedicated unprecedented effort to develop regulation to re-
duce systemic risk. Commentators generally describe systemic risk
as the threat that the failure of one or more significant financial
institutions may trigger a domino effect of insolvencies, destabiliz-
ing the domestic and global economy." During the recent financial
crisis, the threat of systemic risk led to a persisting contraction in
credit markets as well as losses of over seven trillion dollars in U.S.
equity markets and over fifty trillion dollars in global equity mar-
kets.9 With economic uncertainty persisting, the shadow of a deep,
pervasive recession has settled across international financial mar-
kets. 0 In light of the recent crisis, commentators agree that
regulatory authorities must identify the sources of systemic risk and
adopt appropriate measures to reduce the likelihood of future cri-
ses.
6. See Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas 0. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZo L. REv. 159,
159 (2010); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers'Pay, 98 GEO.
L.J. 247 (2010); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation
for Risk Regulation (Emory Public Law, Research Paper 10-93, 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1546229
7. See id.
8. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 241-47 (2008).
9. See Vikas Bajaj, Market Limps into 2009 After a Bruising Year, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 2009,
at Al; Heather Landy, The Stock Slump of 2008: Wrecking Ball to Wealth, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
2009, at F05.
10. See In Depth Coverage of Global Financial Crisis, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ft.com/
indepth/global-financial-crisis.
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This Article demonstrates that successfully addressing systemic
risk concerns ex ante requires reforms that encourage the adoption
and implementation of effective enterprise risk management
(ERM) strategies at systemically significant financial institutions.
In the last three decades, financial products engineers have in-
novatively engaged in the development of quantitative risk
measuring models." Today, financial institutions almost uniformly
use quantitative financial modeling to measure risk exposure and
employ a variety of derivatives strategies to hedge or mitigate
their risk exposure.1 2 Ironically, systemically significant financial
institutions' use of these risk-measuring and risk-mitigating
methods contributed to systemic risk concerns.3
Notwithstanding the significance of risk management oversight
at large, complex financial institutions, some commentators de-
scribe ERM concerns as an internal affairs issue and strongly
oppose federal regulatory oversight. These theorists argue that
regulation of the internal affairs of corporations is traditionally the
province of state law.14 According to these commentators, federal
regulation of ERM is unwarranted, ineffectual, and therefore, un-
desirable.1 5 However, the critique of federal participation in the
regulation of ERM misses three critical issues.
First, while systemic risk is important, the threat of systemic risk
during the recent crisis emerged after expansive losses that resulted
from ERM failures at significant financial institutions. 6 Permitting
private businesses to transfer the costs and negative externalities of
their activities to the public reduces social welfare and engenders
sub-optimal outcomes." Second, while theorists may correctly clas-
sify ERM as an internal affairs issue, 1 this Article argues that state
corporate governance inadequately regulates the conflicts between
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxey Act and the Making of Quack Corpo-
rate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
15. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1779, 1789-95 (2011); Norman Veasey, The Challenges for Directors
in Piloting Through State and Federal Standards in the Maelstrom of Risk Management, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REv. 1, 2, 12-13 (2010).
16. See Kristin N. Johnson, From Diagnosing the Dilemma to Divining a Cure: Regulating Fi-
nancial Markets, 40 SETON HALL L. REv. 1299, 1306-12 (2010) (discussing the collapse of
Bear Stearns).
17. See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons,
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 175 (2011).
18. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 IowA J.
CORP. L. 967, 969 (2009); Robert Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk Management Failures at
Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REv. 47, 106-07 (2011) (discussing how companies manage
risks internally).
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shareholders' long-term interests in the firm and directors and ex-
ecutive officers' short-term interests in increasing the equity share
price.
Third, state legislatures and courts face significant pressure to
adopt and maintain manager-friendly corporate governance poli-
cies. After decades of competition among states to increase the
number of companies incorporated in their jurisdictions, Dela-
ware's indisputable victory has led most states to conform their
standards to Delaware's statutory and judicial standards. States
have the authority to impose heightened fiduciary obligations to
oversee ERM. However, if history is any indicator, it appears unlike-
ly that state courts and legislatures will do so. Delaware courts'
recent decisions applying the same highly deferential standard ap-
plied in claims alleging that directors breached their fiduciary
duties of care or loyalty to claims alleging that directors failed to
adopt reasonable ERM policies presents significant concerns.
In the absence of rigorous ERM obligations under state corpo-
rate law and in the wake of the recent financial crisis, Congress has
taken steps to impose federal regulation on risk management over-
sight. In July of 2010, Congress adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank
Act).w These federal reforms aim to address the gap in risk govern-
ance. Among the several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act
intended to reduce systemic risk, Congress incorporated reforms
to alter the structure and composition of the board to better align
director and executives' incentives to take risk with the long-term
interests of the firm. Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act does not
sufficiently address the persistent organizational limitations that
boards and other group decision-making bodies face.
According to behavioral theorists, the group deliberation pro-
cess engenders many benefits for boards and, consequently, the
corporations that they serve. A group engaging in a deliberative
decision-making process aggregates the knowledge, experience,
skills, wisdom, and expertise of all of the members of the group.
However, adopting a board as the decision-making body of an or-
ganization also creates challenges. Cognitive biases and structural
dynamics undermine the benefits of relying on the decisions made
by boards of directors.
Consequently, reform of systemically significant financial institu-
tions will not effectively address risk management unless the reform
reflects consideration of the cognitive and structural limitations that
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
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plague boards' decision making. While the Dodd-Frank Act is the
most far-reaching and comprehensive financial regulatory reform
since the Great Depression, its measures to address ERM are weak,
misguided, and simply inadequate to improve stability in financial
markets. A different approach, therefore, will be necessary to ac-
complish the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Developing effective reform will require action by the four insti-
tutions that influence risk governance: state regulators, federal
regulators, self-regulatory organizations, and the contractual rela-
tionship between shareholders and directors established in the
corporate charter. Part I offers a primer on enterprise risk man-
agement and argues that innovative risk measuring and risk
mitigating strategies enable directors to carefully monitor risk ex-
posure. While directors' fiduciary obligations established under
state corporate governance standards encompass a duty to moni-
tor, Part II contends that Delaware courts' narrow and deferential
interpretation of directors' fiduciary obligations may not offer a
viable mechanism for imposing liability for directors' failure to
monitor enterprise risk.
Part III analyzes Dodd-Frank's risk management oversight re-
forms. Part III concludes that these federal reforms laudably reflect
an appreciation for the conflicts of interest and self-serving incen-
tives that color directors' evaluation of risk-taking activities.
However, the limited reach of these new regulations suggests that
undesirable or excessive risk taking will persist and directors will
not be subject to more rigorous accountability standards. Part IV
presents a proposal for introducing reforms that consider the in-
fluence of cognitive biases and structural dynamics on risk
governance. Reflecting on the influence of cognitive biases and
structural dynamics will enhance authorities' ability to develop ef-
fective risk management regulation. Finally, this Article offers
concluding remarks.
I. UNDERSTANDING RISK MANAGEMENT
Boards of directors are empowered with the highest level of de-
cision-making authority in corporations-including the authority
to make decisions regarding risk management. For directors at fi-
nancial institutions, understanding the many facets of ERM is
essential. Crafting an accountability standard for directors' duty to
monitor risk and employ appropriate risk management tools re-
quires careful consideration of the benefits and limitations of
recent innovative developments in risk measurement, manage-
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ment, and mitigation strategies. This Part explores the benefits and
the tensions created by emerging and evolving ERM methods. Sec-
tion A considers the attributes of risk and Section B offers a brief
introduction to the role of ERM in financial institutions. Section C
then explores two risk management methods: (1) quantitative risk
models and (2) credit derivatives, specifically credit default swaps.
A. What is Risk?
Risk, broadly defined, describes an element of uncertainty re-
garding future outcomes.2 ' Risks may arise as a result of weather
phenomenon, inflation, changes in government policies, business
cycles, or other natural or human-engineered events. While the
term risk refers to the potential for either a beneficial or a detri-
22
mental outcome, financial institutions typically focus on the latter.
As a consequence, methods developed to measure, mitigate, or
manage risk generally focus on estimating the probability and
magnitude of risks that lead to losses.
The business activities of financial institutions engender unique
risk concerns.24 In addition to facing risks common to all business-
es, the principal commercial activities of financial institutions also
entail risks associated with sophisticated investment decisions.
Financial institutions structure complex lending, underwriting,
20. See PHILIPPEJORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING FINAN-
CIAL RISK 3 (3d ed. 2007). See also FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 15
(1921) (describing risk as calculable or measurable outcomes that may be expressed as nu-
merical probabilities and distinguishing risk from uncertainty, which refers to random
outcomes that occur in an unpredictable manner and may not be quantified).
21. See JORION, supra note 20, at 62.
22. See generally Andreas Krause, Exploring the Limitations of Value at Risk: How Good is it
in Practice?, 4J. RISK FIN. 19, 23-27 (2003) (discussing how companies estimate value at risk
(VaR)).
23. Id.
24. The businesses described as financial institutions in this Article include investment
banking firms; bank holding companies; and traditional savings and commercial deposit
banks or thrifts that engage in investment businesses in the financial services industry in-
cluding custodial, brokerage, lending, and underwriting services for securities and other
assets. In addition, these businesses may offer advisory services for complex transactions
such as mergers or acquisitions. Because of the services that these businesses provide, com-
mentators also describe financial institutions as financial intermediaries. RICHARD S.
CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 36-38 (4th ed. 2009)
(explaining financial intermediaries as business that "take money from investors, pool it,
and invest the pooled money in other enterprises.").
25. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank
Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 797-98 (2010).
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and securitization arrangements. Financial institutions that act as
financial intermediaries serve as market-makers and trade securi-
ties for their proprietary investment portfolios and their clients'
portfolios.
Within the internal governance framework of systemically signif-
icant financial institutions there are typically three classes of
insiders: non-management directors or directors who are not em-
ployees of the company; management-directors who are executive
officers and, therefore, employees of the company; and non-
management employees. Each class of insiders faces conflicts of
interest and incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking.
Management directors who serve as executive officers arguably
have the greatest personal incentives and opportunities to ensure
that accounting statements and other material disclosures, includ-
ing the company's disclosure of risk measuring methods, inspire an
ever-increasing stock price. Management directors influence the
development of risk management policy as members of the board
and senior executive officers of the business. These executives,
through their supervisory authority over non-management em-
ployees, also influence the implementation of corporate
risk management policies. The link between compensation and
risk taking creates a persisting conflict of interest for executive of-
ficers. If financial institutions fail to manage these conflicts
effectively, insiders' incentives may lead to excessive risk-taking,
ERM failures, and possibly, the realization of systemic risk con-
cerns.
Among their many challenges, financial institutions face finan-
cial risk, or the risk of unanticipated losses related to the firm's
proprietary investment portfolio or the inventory of financial
26. ANTHONY SAUNDERS & MARCIA MILLON CORNETT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MAN-
AGEMENT: A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 97-103 (6th ed. 2008).
27. Id. Through market-making activities, financial intermediaries "maintain an inven-
tory of financial instruments or commodities in order to satisfy clients orders to purchase or
sell such instruments." See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 24, at 37. Acting in this capacity, fi-
nancial intermediaries also create a market for illiquid assets by agreeing to acquire illiquid
assets from investors and to hold the ownership interests in the assets in their own proprie-
tary portfolios. Id. There is no readily available market for the illiquid assets. Id. Unlike the
market for liquid assets, such as the market for publicly-traded securities, financial interme-
diaries may have difficulty finding counterparties to trade or exchange the illiquid assets. Id.
"Market making can involve either agency or principle transactions," meaning the market-
maker can engage in proprietary transactions or transactions on behalf of clients. SAUNDERS
& CORNET, supra note 26, at 100. Serving as market-makers, financial intermediaries act as
investors or dealers on behalf of clients for a fee or commission. Market-makers offer a sec-
ondary market for illiquid assets. Id.
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products acquired to facilitate clients' transactions.28 Financial in-
stitutions measure financial risk by calculating the statistical
distribution or variance of possible portfolio returns in relation to
a mean (expected return) . In simple terms, financial risk de-
scribes the likelihood that the return on an investment may be dif-
different from the expected return.30 Having a measure of risk that
compares actual and expected returns allows investors to better
understand risk exposure. Effective management of financial risks
often determines a financial institution's commercial success.
Risk management involves organizational processes that general-
ly include risk identifying, measuring, and mitigating procedures."
Risk management policies analyze the diverse outcomes that may
result from investment decisions and the probability that certain
risks will lead to losses. Risk managers ensure alignment between
an enterprise's risk practices and the company's risk preferences
through audits, internal controls, and forward-looking strategies.
Risk management strategies typically analyze two important classes
of risk: market risk and credit risk.
Commentators describe market risk as the potential for a dra-
matic change in the value of an asset class, such as a sudden
decline in the value of equity securities traded on a national stock
exchange, or a sharp spike in the price of a commodity, such as oil
or gold. Movements in the prices of assets may lead to significant
28. See LINDA ALLEN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING MARKET, CREDIT AND OPERATIONAL
RIsK 2 (2004); JoRION, supra note 20, at 62 (explaining that "risk can be defined as the vola-
tility of unexpected outcomes, generally the value of assets or liabilities of interest").
29. See Krause, supra note 22, at 23-27.
30. SeeJORION, supra note 20, at 62.
31. See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and corpo-
rate Governance, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 573-77 (2008) (discussing scenarios in which risk
mismanagement led to adverse effects on financial institutions).
32. CHRISTOPHER CULP, THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS: BUSINESS STRATEGY AND
TACTICS 109 (2001).
33. Id.; JORION, supra note 20, at 13.
34. Johnson, supra note 17, at 211-14; see also Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordi-
nation, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 323, 337 n.65 (2011) (citingJORION, supra note 20, at 75). Credit
and market risks are only two of many classes of risk that affect financial institutions. SAUN-
DERS & CORNETT, supra note 26, at 598-99. Other significant risks include, among others,
liquidity and operational risks. Id.
35. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL
ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsc222.pdf (describing methods of measuring market risk); INTERNATIONAL CONVER-
GENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS, Amendment to the Capital
Accord to Incorporate Market Risks 1 (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs118.htm (same); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD 98-15323,
RISK-BASED CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND INDUSTRY APPROACHES TO CAPITAL AND RISK
(1998); HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, TRANSACTIONS, POL-
ICY, AND REGULATION 252 (6th ed. 1999).
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gains or losses in a financial institution's proprietary portfolio. For
example, in the years leading to the recent financial crisis, the res-
idential lending unit of Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup), one of the
largest financial institutions in the United States, aggressively orig-
inated increasing volumes of residential mortgages.3 6 Citigroup
earned significant fees for the loans and accumulated a sizeable
inventory of mortgages that the bank repackaged as securities. As a
result, by the fall of 2007, Citigroup had amassed an astounding
level of exposure to the residential mortgage market. As defaults in
the residential mortgage market began to climb, Citigroup and
other lenders holding significant portfolios of residential mortgag-
es experienced debilitating losses.
Unlike the general risk exposure related to market risk, credit
risk describes the specific risk related to the creditworthiness of a
contract counterparty. When entering into a credit agreement, a
creditor faces the risk that the borrower may default on the princi-
pal and interest obligations under the terms of the loan
agreement.7 Under this traditional single borrower-lender model,
a creditor faces the risk that a borrower might fail to satisfy or re-
pay the remaining principal and interest obligations on the loan."
While examining the creditworthiness of a debtor in the single
borrower-lender model involves a reasonably straightforward credit
analysis, financial institutions' efforts to identify and manage credit
risks are markedly more complicated.
Large, complex financial institutions originate loans to many
types of borrowers including corporations with operations around
the world; other banks, thrifts, and more sophisticated financial
institutions; hedge funds; and private equity firms. While some of
these borrowers issue securities that trade on national securities
exchanges and make mandatory periodic disclosures of audited
financial data, others borrowers are not required to make such dis-
closures. 39 The amount of the loan may be several hundred million
or several billion dollars. The borrower may need the loan to repay
outstanding debt obligations, acquire a new business or real estate,
36. See infra Part II.B
37. SeeJohnson, supra note 17, at 207; RENO GALLATI, RISK MANAGEMENT AND CAPI-
TAL ADEQUACY 129-30 (2003) (citation omitted).
38. Johnson, supra note 17, at 206-07; SAUNDERS & CORNETT, SuPra note 26, at 598-99.
39. There are three types of companies subject to the periodic reporting requirements
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Companies whose securities trade on a national
securities exchange, companies with more than $10 million in assets and a class of equity
securities held by at least 500 persons, and companies who filed a registration statement
under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 that has become effective. Security and Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 12(b),(g); Rule 12 g-1; and 15(d). The term "reporting company"
describes any company that is subject to reporting requirements under federal securities law.
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or invest in a diverse array of financial products. The assets that
serve as collateral for the loan may include unregistered securities
that are illiquid, meaning there may not be a readily available mar-
ket for investors to sell or transfer the securities, and, therefore,
the value of the securities may be difficult to assess.
In order to address market, credit, and other risks, market par-
ticipants have long employed various risk management and risk
measurement methods.40 Recent developments in quantitative risk
modeling have further enhanced these risk management practices.
In addition, market participants have developed structured prod-
41
ucts tailored to address risk management concerns.
B. The Development of Modern Risk Management
Theory and Financial Institutions
In the last several decades, financial institutions began to develop
quantitative risk models influenced by scientific and mathematical
theories. These models introduce a more refined risk measurement
method.4 ' The adoption of quantitative models illustrates a para-
digm shift away from traditional risk management programs that
employed a myopic, "silo" approach to more sophisticated risk man-
agement strategies. The traditional fragmented approach to risk
management encouraged each business manager to evaluate risks
relevant to her specific unit's performance.
This approach suffered from two significant flaws. First, manag-
ers only focused on specific risks, such as interest rate risk, foreign
currency exchange rate risk, or volatility in securities pricing that
44
threatened the performance of their particular business units.
Managers did not consider the correlation of risks across the
company's business units. 45 Second, this approach failed to create
incentives for managers to communicate risks up the chain to
40. JORION, supra note 20, at 8-9 ("[i]nsurance contracts which have been traced to
the Babylonian system of robbery insurance for caravans, use diversification principles to
protect against accidents and other disasters"). Frequently used modern risk management
products, such as portfolio insurance and traditional insurance products, offer helpful but
imperfectly designed protection against losses. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the
Rogue, 51 ARIz. L. REv. 127, 140-41 (2009).
41. See Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 968; Michelle M. Harner, Ignoring the Witing on the
Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 45
(2010); Johnson, supra note 16.
42. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 31, at 577-84 (describing the development of
quantitative risk models).
43. Id. at 581.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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directors and failed to encourage managers and lower-level
employees to take responsibility for the ways that their risk-
engendering decisions increased risks in other business units.
In the 1990s, theorists introduced ERM or enterprise-wide risk
management methods.46 ERM employs a more holistic, compre-
hensive, and integrated approach to risk management that
considers a broader spectrum of potential risks and the correla-
tion among risks in distinct business units. ERM enhances
businesses' ability to identify risks in one business unit that may
lead to losses in another business unit, a risk management failure,
widespread losses, or insolvency. Risk management programs that
identify and predict correlations among risks engender a more
meaningful assessment of risk.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO) has introduced one of the most widely
48
adopted ERM approaches. COSO's ERM framework involves sev-
eral elements, including careful evaluation of a firm's risk culture;
articulation of a clear statement of the firm's risk objectives and
risk management policy; development of responses to risks ex ante,
and improvement of the flow of communication, information, and
monitoring of risk across the enterprise. COSO's proposed
framework also assigns responsibility for risk management over-
sight to everyone who works for the business.o The framework
requires everyone engaged in accomplishing an enterprise's busi-
ness goals to act in a manner reasonably consistent with the
company's risk management objectives.
Under COSO's approach, a company's board of directors, man-
agement, and lower-level employees participate in the
development and application of ERM strategies.5' COSO's ap-
proach intends for people at each level of an enterprise to act
collectively to identify potential risks that may affect the business. 3
COSO's ERM methodology emphasizes best practices and other
54
practical solutions to ERM concerns.
46. Id. at 580.
47. Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
1323, 1332 (2010).
48. COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, ENTERPRISE RISK MAN-




50. Id. at 2.
51. See id, at 6.
52. See id, at 2.
53. See id. at 6-7.
54. See id.
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ERM policies improve risk-related communications by enhanc-
ing the flow of information through vertical and horizontal
channels within a business. Formal communication across business
units and active participation by directors as well as managers and
lower-level employees is vital to the successful development and
implementation of effective ERM programs.-5 While the board de-
signs risk management guidelines, managers supervise lower-level
employees' compliance with ERM policies.
To be successful, ERM programs require lower-level employees
to report concerns regarding unanticipated circumstances encoun-
tered in daily operations up the chain to managers. Managers
periodically relay information to senior executives regarding fre-
quently recurring risk management concerns or extraordinary
events that are unaddressed by existing risk management policies.
Senior executives interpret risk management guidelines adopted
by the board and instruct managers regarding the application of
the guidelines to unanticipated concerns or extraordinary events.
In addition, senior executives advise the board of directors regard-
ing amendments to or revisions of existing policies. Finally, senior
executives from various business units, risk managers, and compli-
ance professionals report risk policy concerns to a chief risk officer
or a committee of the board designated to develop risk manage-
ment policies. Firms that adopt ERM policies benefit from the
enhanced communication across the firm and heightened sensitiv-
ity to risk from the bottom up.
In addition to changes in risk management practices in recent
years, theorists have also developed more sophisticated approaches
to measure and mitigate risk. Emerging ERM methods offer a
mechanism for evaluating and reducing the risk associated with a
specific business decision. The next Section describes two of these
innovative risk measuring and risk mitigating techniques, and de-
scribes growing concerns that market participants' adaptation of
risk mitigating methods may result in increased risk exposure.
C. Measuring and Mitigating Risk: Quantitative Risk
Models and Credit Derivatives
For centuries, businesses have employed strategies or techniques
to manage risks, and thereby enhance or preserve the value of
55. See Harner, supra note 47, at 1334.
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their assets.16 Businesses have employed a plethora of risk manage-
ment methods, from purchasing insurance to selectively avoiding
business opportunities subject to volatile price movements, or
simply limiting leverage." Financial institutions have demonstrated
self-discipline in risk oversight by adopting and enhancing their
risk management strategies. Their efforts frequently include adopt-
ing comprehensive internal controls and developing quantitative
risk models. Consistent with financial institutions' individual efforts
to regulate risk, financial industry regulators also began to institute
risk management disclosure and compliance obligations. As a re-
56. See Simkins & Ramirez supra note 31, at 577-78; see generally Charles R.P. Pouncy,
Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 519-32
(1998) (discussing the history of financial innovation).
57. While a comprehensive review of all ERM methods is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, the discussion focuses on two of the most significant and broadly adopted methods of
measuring and mitigating risk.
58. Susan M. Phillips, Derivatives And Risk Management: Challenges And Opportunities, 15
Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 239, 242-43 (1994).
59. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 31, at 589-90 (discussing the disclosure and
compliance obligations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Financial institutions in the United
States, for example, face domestic banking regulation often influenced by efforts to adopt
global risk management standards. While federal and state banking regulations date back
more than two hundred years, the 1970s and the 1980s inspired a renewed commitment to
develop more carefully crafted banking regulations. International banking authorities have
recommended that countries with large banking institutions adopt conservative regulatory
requirements, such as increased capital requirements. According to these authorities, ensur-
ing the liquidity and consequently, the solvency, of the world's largest banks is critical to
ensuring the stability of the global banking industry. See, e.g., Malcolm C. Alfriend, Interna-
tional Risk Based Capital Standard: History and Explanation, EcoN. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 28,
34. Senior American banking regulators and government officials began to collaborate with
banking officials in other countries with well-developed banking and financial services sec-
tors. See id. at 33-34. In addition, regulators adopted requirements for companies subject to
periodic reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to disclose the use
and limitations of nascent methods to measure and manage risk. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.305(a)(1) (2008).
As a result of increasing use of derivatives in the 1990s, the SEC adopted regulations requir-
ing firms to include disclosure of quantitative risk models in their financial statements. See 17
C.F.R § 210.4-08(n) (2009) (requiring specific accounting policies for certain derivative in-
struments). In 1993, a report by the Group of Thirty, a committee of international banking
executives, regulators, and academics, periodically meeting to discuss global macro-economic
conditions, endorsed the use of quantitative financial models as a means of measuring risk
exposure in derivatives markets. See GROUP OF THIRTY, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP,
DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 10 (1993). Shortly thereafter, international banking
regulators adopted VaR. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO
THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 44 (1996), available at http://www.
bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf. Domestic banking regulators also imposed VaR disclosure obliga-
tions. See CAPITAL ADEQUACY GUIDELINES FOR STATE MEMBER BANKS; MARKET RISK
MEASURE, 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. E, § 3(a)(2)(i) (2008) (state member banks); CAPITAL
ADEQUACY GUIDELINES FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: MARKET RISK MEASURE, 12 C.F.R.
pt. 225, app. E, § 3(a)(2)(i) (2008) (bank holding companies); see also Darryll Hendricks &
Beverly Hirtle, Bank Capital Requirements for Market Risk: The Internal Models Approach,
FRBNY EcON. POL'Y REv., Dec. 1997, at 1, 8.
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sult, financial institutions' boards of directors and senior execu-
tives now commit significant resources to identifying effective risk
management, measurement, and mitigation methods to reduce
their exposure to financial, market, and credit risks.
1. Risk Modeling
As Section A explained, all businesses face a diverse array of
risks. Typically, financial institutions' business models include a
business unit that executes securities, commodities, derivatives,
and other capital and credit market transactions on behalf of the
firm using the firm's capital or clients' capital. 0 In addition, the
capital markets or underwriting business units of financial institu-
tions often hold significant amounts of securities in the firm's own
investment portfolio or to facilitate clients' transactions.6' As a re-
sult of the need to maintain these holdings, financial institutions
are vulnerable to sharp declines in the value of assets traded in the
capital, credit, and derivatives markets."
In response to the financial services industry's demand, theorists
began developing quantitative risk measuring models in the
1950s." In a seminal article published in the Journal of Finance in
1952, Harry Markowitz introduced one of the earliest quantitative
models designed to measure portfolio risk." Later models adapted
Markowitz's theory to allow the model to measure risk more accu-
65rately across a broader group of assets.
While several quantitative financial models followed, financial
institutions quickly began to adopt and adapt various iterations of
one particular model, the Value-at-Risk (VaR) model. First intro-
duced in the 1980s, VaR measures the potential loss in value of an
asset or portfolio at a given confidence level over a specified peri-
od. VaR is a statistical model that relies on historic market price
60. See SAUNDERS & CORNETT, supra note 26, at 97-103.
61. Dombalagian, supra note 25, at 807-08.
62. See SAUNDERS & CORNETT, supra note 26, at 97-103.
63. See generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) [hereinafter
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection]; HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENT (1959) [hereinafter MARKOWITZ, EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICA-
TION].
64. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, supra note 63. Modern portfolio theory measures the
expected return on a portfolio by calculating the weighted average of the returns of each of
the portfolios assets given the variance of possible returns or risk exposure created by each
of the portfolio's positions.
65 SeeJORIAN supra note 20, at 159-86.
66. See generally GLYN A. HOLTON, VALUE-AT-RISK: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2003); The
Risks of Financial Modeling: VaR and the Economic Meltdown: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
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data to determine what is likely to happen tomorrow to the value
of an asset or portfolio .
VaR's most valuable benefit, the ability to predict exposure to fu-
ture losses, makes the model highly attractive to financial
institutions. Financial institutions measure their individual success
and performance relative to industry benchmarks. Developing a
successful track record of performance relative to a benchmark
often depends on consistently and accurately predicting movement
in the prices of securities, commodities, or other assets. VaR ena-
bles financial institutions to anticipate their losses related to
certain investment positions, thereby reducing losses and enhanc-
ing their performance relative to an industry benchmark. VaR has
quickly become one of the most widely-adopted risk measuring
tools in the financial services industry." While original VaR models
measured the risk of loss related to an individual portfolio, subse-
quent iterations allow the models to measure the cumulative risk of
loss across a group of portfolios, multiple business divisions, or an
entire firm. 0
VaR is a back simulation model, meaning the model measures
the potential risk of loss by evaluating the current net asset value of
Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Tech., 111th Cong. (2009) (state-
ment of Richard Bookstaber), available at http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/
Commdocs/hearings/2009/Oversight/10sep/BookstaberTestimony.pdf. [hereinafter Risk
of Financial Modeling Hearing]. Stated differently, VaR refers to the amount that may be
lost on a specific portfolio over specified period. Relying on Carl Friedrich Gauss's work
measuring portfolio risk along a normal distribution curve, VaR explains the probability of
outcomes distributed along a "bell" curve. SeeJoRION, supra note 20, at 84 (describing the
seventeenth century experiments of Blaise Pascal exploring probability distributions and the
subsequent discovery by eighteenth century scientist and mathematician Karl Gauss indicat-
ing that the normal distribution of outcomes resembles a bell-shaped curve). Scholars refer
to a normal distribution curve as a bell curve because the normal distribution of statistically
probable outcomes tend to cluster around smaller changes creating a rising pattern in the
middle of the curve when illustrated, while the distributions of less-frequent outcomes tend
to fall along the ends of the curve. See Philippe Jorion, In Defense of VAR, DERIVATIVES
STRATEGY (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.derivativesstrategy.com/magazine/archive.
For example, for a portfolio of stocks that is calculated to have a one-day 95 percent VaR of
$1 million, managers may conclude that there is a 5 percent probability that the portfolio
will lose more than $1 million in the twenty-four hours following the calculation of VaR,
assuming markets function in a normal manner and no trading occurs on the assets in the
portfolio. See id.
67. See Krause, supra note 22, at 23; see also ASWATH DAMOSARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAK-
ING: A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 201 (2008).
68. DAMOSARAN, supra note 67, at 202 ("VaR enables financial institutions to anticipate
their losses related to certain investment positions, thereby reducing losses and enhancing
their performance relative to an industry benchmark.").
69. Whitehead, supra note 34, at 330.
70. See Krause, supra note 22, at 19. ("Originally VaR was intended to measure the risks
in derivatives markets, but it became widely applied in financial institutions to measure all
kinds of financial risks, primarily market and credit risks.").
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a portfolio using a historic reference point.7' The reference point
may be yesterday, a week ago, a month ago, or a year ago.7 2 The
model revalues the portfolio's currently held assets or positions
based on the market prices for the same investments on the select-
ed historic date. VaR back simulation models typically use the
market prices for the current assets over a five hundred day peri-
od. The model then evaluates the portfolio's performance on
each of the five hundred days and ranks performance according to
the days that the portfolio had the highest returns and the lowest
returns. VaR estimates future losses based on the assumption that
the market will perform in the future as it performed in the past.
VaR communicates risk exposure as a single dollar amount, allow-
ing directors, executives, regulators, and investors to understand
and better manage risk. As described earlier in this Section, most
financial institutions voluntarily implemented VaR models. Within
ten years of the introduction of VaR, federal regulations introduced
VaR-related disclosure obligations and VaR-related capital require-
ments.7 6 In addition, innovative managers began to use these risk
77
measuring financial models as tools for active risk management.
VaR back simulation models, however, have significant limitations.
First, the back simulation models assume that past performance of-
fers useful guidance for predicting future results.7 ' This assumption
disregards the inherent and continuous movement of asset prices
in financial markets. However, financial market conditions may
change rapidly because of unprecedented or unanticipated events,
uncertainty, or disclosure of unexpected information.75 The models
fail to consider that rare, infrequent, or unprecedented events may
lead to detrimental losses in financial markets.o
While low probability events may cause the most significant dis-
ruptions in financial markets, VaR risk estimates often offer limited
guidance regarding the likelihood and magnitude of low probability
71. JORION, supra note 20, at 8-9.
72. Id.




77. Risk of Financial Modeling Hearing, supra note 66; see Krause, supra note 22, at 26.
78. Krause, supra note 22, at 20.
79. Rene M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They Happen?,
HARV. Bus. REv., Oct. 2009, at 58.
80. Id. Theorists refer to the low probability events that represent less frequent distri-
butions and occur on the ends of the distribution curve as "tail" risks. David Einhorn &
Aaron Brown, Cover Story: Point/Counterpoint: Private Profits and Socialized Risk, GLOBAL ASSN.
OF RISK PROF'LS,June-July 2008, at 11 (explaining VaR's shortcomings).
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events." Second, VaR also fails to consider the correlations among
risks or the coupling of risks. Some commentators posit that VaR's
assessment of low probability events was reasonable and not the
fatal flaw that popular media suggests." Rather, the critical error,
according to these commentators, was market participants' complete
dismissal of the potential occurrence and magnitude of low probabil-
ity events. 3 VaR's shortcomings inspired efforts to develop financial
models that more accurately reflect real world uncertainty.8 4
Employing stochastic processes developed by botanists, mathe-
maticians, physicists, and chemists, financial analysts developed
Monte Carlo simulations to examine the interaction between de-
terministic variables (such as the historic changes in prices) and
the randomness inherent in the price movements in specific finan-
cial products, such as changes in the price of equity securities, debt
securities, or derivatives." Monte Carlo simulation models permit
financial institutions to better assess risks based on the correlations
among risks.86 Rather than relying solely on historic data and as-
suming that variables in the financial models change in isolation,
Monte Carlo models simulate changes in market prices and the
impact of related factors." In a Monte Carlo simulation, a financial
institution employs statistics to calculate the covariances, or corre-
lations, among risks."
To conduct a Monte Carlo simulation, a financial institution first
identifies risks and determines the relationships among the risks."
Next, the model simulates market prices and calculates an average
price based on the simulated market prices.8 The results reflect
the net present value of the portfolio, the average net present val-
ue of the simulation, and the volatility, as well as other variables
that may affect the value of the portfolio.""
Monte Carlo simulations are quite complex. The expensive and
time consuming process of gathering the vast data that informs the
models often deters financial institutions from using the models
81. Stulz, supra note 79, at 63-64.
82. See Nocera supra note 2.
83. Id.
84. STEPHEN A. Ross, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD, & JEFFREY JAFFEE, CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 206-214 (8th ed. 2008).
85. See Nocera, supra note 2; see generally ScoTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: How A NEW
BREED OF MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT (2010).
86. JORIAN, supra note 20, at 265.
87. See generally Nicholas Metropolis, The Beginning Of The Monte Carlo Method, 1987 Los
ALAMOS SCIENCE 125, available at http://ibrary.lanl.gov/la-pubs/00326866.pdf.
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widely across their firms. The models' accuracy relies on the in-
tegrity of sophisticated technology, including proprietary software,
that codes data and indicates the relevance of data based on the
likelihood that a forecasted event may occur." Modeling the "distri-
butions of each variable or the interactions between variables" is
difficult, and the evaluations generated by the programs are lim-
ited."04 However, the results lack both human intuition and economic
analysis informed by a more comprehensive understanding of mar-
kets and investors' behavior.
Stress tests offer another widely-adopted risk management
methodology that allows financial institutions to examine results of
identified risks and hypothetical events. A stress test analyzes a
company's loan and securities portfolios under the conditions of a
"baseline" (normal) market scenario and a "more adverse" market
scenario, and then calculates the amount of capital necessary for
the business to maintain stability under the more adverse condi-
tions.96
During the recent financial crisis, federal regulators required
systemically significant financial institutions to conduct stress tests
to enable financial institutions to identify reasonable threats to
their ability to weather adverse market conditions. Stress tests
incorporate hypothetical, exceptional, but plausible events into
their analysis.99 Stress tests require financial institutions to revalue
the positions in their portfolios based on these hypothetical market
conditions.99 The stress tests reveal vulnerabilities in the portfolio
of assets under the stress test scenarios."o
The results of stress tests also face significant limitations. Similar
to back simulation models, scenario stress tests analyze historically
significant events to create the hypothetical events applied by the
model. While the incorporation of hypothetical events into scenar-
io stress tests supplements VaR's back simulation analysis by
offering a more comprehensive view of future risk exposure, these
models offer little or no indication of the impact of unprecedented
92. RoSS ET AL., supra note 84, at 218.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 210.
96. Andru Wall, The 2009 Stress TRsts: A Model for Periodic Transparent Examinations of the
Largest Bank Holding Companies, 128 BANKING L.J. 291, 295-96 (2011).
97. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL As-
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events. In addition, scenario stress tests, like Monte Carlo simula-
tions, do not account for other more elusive and perhaps more
debilitating low-probability events. The utility of a stress test is sig-
nificantly influenced by the creativity or the economic, social, and
political forecasting abilities of the financial analysts who engineer
the test.''
While stress tests are designed to measure a company's ability to
weather a worst-case scenario, the effectiveness of the tests requires
insightful and accurate business decisions regarding appropriate
scenarios and simulations. Criticism regarding the model's limita-
tions misunderstands the rationale for employing the tests. The
models were never touted as a means to predict the future.
2. Credit Derivatives
Derivatives contracts offer another ERM tool that allows finan-
cial institutions to manage and mitigate risks. The history of
derivative instruments dates back several hundred years. 0 2 In their
simplest form, derivatives contracts are bilateral contracts that al-
low a party facing the risk that an asset will decline in value to
transfer some or all of the risk exposure to a counterparty.13 In
credit derivatives contracts, the reference asset is a debt instru-
ment.104 There are two classes of credit derivatives: credit default
swap agreements and collateralized debt obligations.105
In a credit default swap agreement, a party with risk exposure (a
protection buyer) seeks to transfer a portion of the risk related to
the reference asset to a counterparty (a protection seller) who be-
lieves that the value of the asset will not decline.' The agreement
is referred to as a derivatives contract because the value of the
agreement is derived from the value of the asset referenced in the
contract (reference asset) .xo The reference asset may be a single
borrower/single-lender loan, a portfolio of loans, a debt security,
or any debt asset. In the event that the reference asset declines in
101. JORION, supra note 20, at 357.
102. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 31, at 577-78; Johnson, supra note 17, at 192.
103. See generally Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their
Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1 (1996).
104. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel Jr., The Promise and Peils of Credit Derivatives, 75
U. CIN. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (2006).
105. Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to Approach the Inter-
pretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAMJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 727-28 (2008).
106. SeeJohnson, supra note 17, at 199-201 (explaining how risk is transferred in for-
wards contracts).
107. See id. at 194.
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value or the issuer of the reference asset defaults, the protection
seller agrees to pay the protection buyer a sum equal to the differ-
ence between the face value of the asset and the reduced market
value of the asset or some previously agreed upon percentage of
the face value of the debt asset."o' After entering into the credit
default swap agreement, the protection buyer faces reduced risk
exposure. In exchange for agreeing to accept the transferred risk,
109
the protection seller receives a lump sum or periodic payments.
Why do businesses enter into credit default swaps? Imagine an in-
vestor owns a bond (debt asset) issued by Boeing, Inc. that matures
in ten years. If the bondholder becomes concerned that Boeing may
default on its bond payment obligations, the investor enters into a
credit default swap agreement. The agreement is a bilateral contract
and its terms provide for the bondholder to obtain insurance-like
protection against a decline in the value of the Boeing bond. If Boe-
ing defaults, the credit default swap counterparty agrees to
purchase the bond at face value or pay the bondholder the differ-
ence between the face value and the market price of the bond at
the time of Boeing's default. Consequently, the bondholder avoids
or mitigates his losses. Arguably, credit default swaps reduce the
credit and market risk exposure related to debt investments.
Innovative developments in derivatives contracts now allow mar-
ket participants to enter into swap agreements to reduce the risk of
loss related to energy products, currency, precious metals, credit
instruments, and equity and debt securities markets."o Moreover,
financial product engineers introduced variations of swaps that
allowed protection buyers to enter into agreements that offered
protection against the decline in the value of an asset that the pro-
tection buyer did not own. These so-called naked swap agreements
allow protection buyers who suspect that a debt issuer will likely
default on its debt obligations to profit from anticipating the debt
issuer's default. Because the protection buyer in a naked swap does
not have any risk exposure if the referenced asset declines in value,
108. Id. at 192; Romano, supra note 103, at 47.
109. See Arving Rajan, A Primer on Credit Default Swaps, in THE STRUCTURED CREDIT
HANDBOOK 17, 17 (2007) ("A credit default swap ... is a contract in which the buyer of
default protection pays a fee, typically quarterly or semiannually, to the seller of default
protection on a reference entity, in exchange for a payment in case of a defined credit event
such as default.").
110. See generally ROBERT E. WHALEY, DERIVATIVES: MARKETS, VALUATION, AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 679-80, 687-88 (2006) (discussing various types of debt obligations that a
credit default swap agreement may reference, including credit-linked notes, collateralized
debt obligations, and debt securities); Romano, supra note 103, at 25, 47-50 (explaining
options in oil and swaps in currency).
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many commentators strongly criticized these agreements as mere
tools for speculation.'"
In addition to credit default swaps, market participants also use
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to mitigate risk exposure.
Financial institutions create CDOs through a process described as
securitization in which an underwriter aggregates asset-backed
debt obligations, converts the many collateralized debt obligations
into securities, and distributes the securities to investors.
More specifically, the underwriter forms a special investment ve-
hicle (SIV) for the purpose of acquiring and bundling CDOs into
securities. Next, the underwriter arranges the investment units of
the SIV into tranches and sells the investments to investors who
expect to earn dividends based on the cash flows that the underly-
ing debt instruments generate."2 Under the terms of the SIVs
governing agreements, owners in different tranches had different
rights to dividend payments and were assigned levels of priority in
case the SIV became insolvent.
Initially, market participants believed that this financing struc-
ture mitigated risk because, in the event of default by the debt
issuers, the SIVs spread losses across a group of investors, reducing
the risk that a series of defaults would be detrimental to any one
investor or lender. Many senior banking and regulatory officials
viewed the rise of securitization as beneficial because the related
financial products spread risk among many market participants
and reduced the concentration of risk.
In the years leading to the recent financial crisis, directors and
executives emphasized the credit risk reduction benefits of credit
derivatives while ignoring the credit and market risks that these in-
struments create. For example, many financial institutions increased
their residential mortgage origination businesses or acquired signifi-
cant volumes of residential mortgages from third-party originators in
order to bundle debt obligations and underwrite additional CDOs."3
In 2007, as the interest rates adjusted on a large volume of ad-
justable-rate subprime mortgages and the borrowers for the
mortgages began to default, financial institutions that participated
in underwriting CDOs for SIVs faced mounting losses."4 These fi-
nancial institutions maintained large inventories of subprime
mortgages used in the creation of securitization products; when
the value of the mortgages declined, the institutions' inventories
111. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Naked Came the Speculators, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2008, at BUL.
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triggered concentrated losses. In addition, some banks, such as
Citigroup, distributed SIV interests that granted investors a "liquid-
ity put.""5 The unique terms of the liquidity put permitted
investors to sell their SIV interests back to the underwriter of the
SIV if credit markets contracted and the investments lost value.'16
To protect against losses related to CDO interests or to speculate
regarding the movement of the value of the mortgage-backed as-
sets contained in CDOs, many market participants entered into
CDS arrangements. The unraveling of the CDO market initiated a
daisy-chain effect of losses in the credit default swap market.
Managers mistakenly assumed that CDOs and credit default
swaps provided guarantees that eliminated exposure to risk of
loss."' The assumption that credit default swaps eliminated exposure
to risk of loss for the owner of the reference asset, however, ig-
nored the credit risk that the counterparty to the CDS agreement
may default on its payment obligations. Moreover, risk models that
failed to account for a decline in the value of residential mortgages
and other debt assets created unanticipated market risk.
Financial institutions' miscalculation of the known risks related
to credit derivatives and their failure to address these risks through
ERM policies fueled systemic risk concerns during the recent cri-
sis."" In an ironic twist, these errors undermined the risk-shifting
benefits that credit derivatives offered and created crippling expo-
sure to debilitating losses. Defaults on subprime mortgages created
a tidal wave of losses that washed across financial institutions."9
The development and proliferation of risk measuring and risk
mitigating strategies raise new questions regarding the breadth of
directors' risk oversight obligations. Legal standards typically aim
to balance directors' authority and accountability. If accountability
115. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing A Financial Crisis: Reflec-
tions on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
Bus. & DEV. L.J. 113, 117 n.15 (2010) (citing Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 113).
116. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Upon discovering the correlation between devastating losses during the crisis and strategies
such as warehousing subprime mortgages and offering liquidity puts, Citigroup equity inves-
tors initiated derivative law suits. See id. See also Gevurtz, supra note 115, at 117.
117. See Am. INS. GRP., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 94 (2007), available at http://
idea.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012308 002280/y44393e10vk.htm [here-
inafter AIG '07 ANNUAL REPORT]; William K. Sjostrom Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 943, 957 (2009); Carrick Mollenkamp et. al., Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models
Failed to Pass Real-World Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2008, at A4; Gretchen Morgenson, Be-
hind Biggest Insurer's Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2008, at Al; Adam
Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS.COM, Sept. 18 2008, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2008/09/18/us-how-aig-fell-apart-idUSMAR85972720080918.
118. SeeJohnson, supra note 16, at 1308.
119. Eric Dash, Citigroup to Halt Dividend and Curb Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at Al.
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standards are too restrictive, directors may act conservatively to
avoid liability and, therefore, they may elect not to pursue profita-
ble business strategies that involve acceptable levels of risk. If
standards are too lenient, directors may have incentives to engage
in excessive risk-taking and discourage the adoption of risk over-
sight policies, such as effective ERM strategies.
The next Part explores how state law evaluates derivative claims
that directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to adopt
effective risk management policies and to uphold their obligations
to monitor the risk exposure of a financial institution. In Part II,
this Article argues that state courts and legislatures are a significant
source of corporate law and the primary voice in corporate gov-
ernance standards. Notwithstanding the critical role states play in
corporate governance, it is unclear whether the legislators who
adopt state law and state courts that enforce corporate governance
obligations will implement sufficient mechanisms to address ERM
concerns.
II. STATE-LAW SOLUTIONS To RISK MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
Corporate governance, commonly perceived as a traditional
province of state law, balances directors' accountability for risk
management oversight with their authority to manage the busi-
ness of the corporation. While the law should not stymie socially
desirable entrepreneurial activities, ineffective ERM policies leave
financial institutions vulnerable to individual risk management
failures and the financial markets susceptible to systemic risk. In
an effort to address these competing values, this Part explores
significant normative questions regarding state law accountability
standards involving claims that directors violated their duty to
monitor. Corporate governance policies attempt to balance direc-
tors' and executive officers' accountability for corporate affairs
with their authority to oversee the business of the corporation. so
This Part argues that state statutes and common law are defer-
ential to executives and directors and, therefore, fail to impose
rigorous accountability standards for risk management oversight.
Section A describes the development of directors' fiduciary obli-
gations to monitor the business and affairs of corporations.
Section B argues that state corporate governance measures offer
120. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 104 (2008); see also Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the
Art and International Regulation, 59 AM.J. Comp. L. 1, 8 (2011).
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insufficient solutions for addressing ERM weaknesses and the con-
flicts between ERM policies and inside directors' and officers' short
term incentives to engage in risk-taking.
A. The Road to Director's Duty to Monitor
Shareholders, the residual equity owners in a corporation, rarely
participate in the management of the daily affairs of large, publicly
traded corporations. While the merits of this classic separation of
ownership and control have been debated for nearly one hundred
years,1 2 ' state statutes clearly adopt an agency model and grant di-
rectors the authority to manage the business of the corporation.
The boards of directors of most large, publicly traded corpora-
tions are comprised of two classes of directors. Non-management
directors, also described as outside directors, receive limited
compensation from the company and are presumed to be critical of
and impartial toward management proposals because of their lim-
ited material financial relationship with the company or its
affiliates. 2 2 In contrast, inside directors or management directors,
receive compensation and other material benefits for their service
as directors, as well as their service as employees-often executive
officers-of the company. Financial institutions are generally pub-
licly traded companies and their boards typically reflect this dual-
class approach. Because the board generally articulates significant
business polices, such as ERM policies, inside directors often act as
both creators and enforcers of risk management plans.'2 3
Delaware state courts have long described the relationship be-
tween directors and shareholders as a fiduciary relationship. 1 2 4
Courts characterize directors' fiduciary obligations as encompass-
ing several duties including (1) a duty of care, requiring directors
to exercise care and to act with reasonable skill and prudence in
service of the corporation's interests; and (2) a duty of loyalty,
121. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 2010) (1932); see also William Bratton, Berle and
Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26J. CORP. L. 737, 738 (2001).
122. Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73,
83-84 (2007).
123. Harner, supra note 47, at 48-49.
124. See Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299 (1921) ("Directors and officers of a corpora-
tion are trustees for the stockholders, and their acts are to be tested according to the well-
established rules of equity .. . A trustee cannot profit by his office, and must be loyal and
frank to those be represents.").
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requiring directors to avoid self-dealing, or, if conflicts arise, to
place the corporation's interests ahead of their own interests.2
Delaware is the jurisdiction of choice for a significant percent-
age of American corporations.12' As a result, Delaware courts have a
preeminent role in the development of corporate law and corpo-
rate governance standards.1 2 7 Following the recent financial crisis,
Delaware's standards regarding directors' fiduciary obligations to
manage and monitor risk have attracted national attention. "
Corporate law scholarship comprehensively examines Dela-
ware's fiduciary obligations jurisprudence and the reasons
Delaware continues to apply a management-friendly approach to
directors' fiduciary duties. When businesses and investors urgently
turned to Delaware for a clear liability standard for risk oversight,
the quagmire of Delaware's standard left many unsatisfied.
Many commentators assumed that because boards were ac-
countable for monitoring risk practices, the boards of systemically
significant financial institutions had sufficient incentives to regu-
late themselves in a manner that would prevent these businesses
from taking excessive risks. Moreover, the development of risk
management measures and risk mitigation strategies further sug-
gested that boards at systemically significant financial institutions
had access to resources that should have enabled them to prevent
or at least minimize exposure to the losses experienced during the
crisis.
As the losses related to the financial crisis began to multiply rap-
idly, so too did the questions regarding directors' duty to monitor
risk taking practices. Had the boards of directors been asleep at
the switch? Delaware's director liability standards, fairly described
as a quagmire, did not clearly resolve these questions regarding the
risk oversight duties of a board with access to sophisticated risk
management tools.
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company was one of the
earliest Delaware cases recognizing a board of directors' obligation
to monitor executives and employees' activities in order to detect
violations of existing law or corporate misconduct.1 2 9 The share-
holders in Graham filed derivative claims alleging that directors
breached their fiduciary duties by failing to discover and prevent
125. FRANK GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAw 278 (2d. West 2010).
126. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, choice of Forum, and Delaware's Stake in Cor-
porate Law, 34 DEL.J. CORP. L. 57, 59 (2009).
127. Id.
128. Mark Roe, Delaware's ShrinkingHalf-Life, 62 STAN. L. REv. 125, 133-35 (2009).
129. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); see also Eric J. Pan, A Board's Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 717, 721 (2009-10).
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employees' activities that violated federal antitrust law.130 The Gra-
ham court rejected Plaintiffs claims and concluded that the
board's oversight obligations arise only where directors "ignored,
either willfully or through inattention, obvious danger signs of
employee wrongdoing."'31
Where directors had no actual knowledge of illegal activities and
no cause for suspicion, the Graham court concluded that the duty
to monitor does not impose an obligation "upon the directors to
install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out
wrongdoing."'32 Instead of creating incentives for the board to be-
come better informed, Graham established a high threshold for
liability. Under Graham, directors' liability rested on whether the
board was aware of wrongdoing or misconduct and failed to ad-
dress the prohibited activities.1
Several decades later in In re Caremark, a Delaware Chancery
Court read the Graham opinion to apply a lower threshold for lia-
bility. In 1994, Caremark International, Inc. (Caremark) entered
into a plea agreement with the Department of Justice and several
other federal agencies.1 4 Caremark pled guilty to one felony count
of mail fraud and agreed to pay approximately $250 million in
fines and penalties related to alleged kickbacks that violated feder-
al law. Responding to the significant fines and penalties, in 1996,
shareholders filed a derivative lawsuit to recover the corporations'
losses related to the fines. The shareholders argued that directors
breached their fiduciary duties by allowing "a situation to develop
and continue which exposed the corporation to enormous legal
liability and that in so doing they violated a duty to be active moni-
tors of corporate performance."
According to the Caremark court, claims alleging that directors
breached their fiduciary duty of care may arise in two distinct con-
texts: (1) When a board makes a decision that is grossly negligent
that results in a loss136 or (2) when there is "an unconsidered
130. Graham, 188 A.2d at 127.
131. Id. at 130.
132. Id.
133. Pan, supra note 129, at 722.
134. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that
Caremark's businesses revenues included Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement subject to
the terms of the Anti-Referral Payments Law that prohibited health care providers from
making payments to providers to induce them to make referrals for Medicare or Medicaid
patients).
135. Id. The nature of plaintiffs' claims inspired the moniker "Caremark claims,"
adopted by subsequent courts in derivative suits alleging that directors breached their fidu-
ciary obligations by failing to monitor corporate activities to ensure compliance with law and
prevent detectable fraud.
136. Id. at 967.
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failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention
would, arguably, have prevented the Ioss."'"3 The Caremark plaintiffs
alleged that the directors' inattention-not a business decision-
led to the losses. As a result, the court evaluated plaintiffs' claims
according to the legal standard applied to the second category of
claims.
Chancellor Allen interpreted Graham to explain that absent
grounds to suspect deception, the board may not be held liable for
merely trusting employees to act honestly or with integrity in exe-
cuting their responsibilities."3 Caremark was an enterprise with
more than 7,000 employees and over 90 branches. 39 The board was
not expected to monitor the daily activities of each employee.4 0
However, departing from Graham's deferential standard
Chancellor Allen further explained that the board has an
obligation to act in good faith to ensure the company's compliance
with legal and regulatory standards. 4 ' Directors may breach their
fiduciary duties by failing to make a good faith attempt to establish
an internal reporting system designed to ensure the company and
employees comply with the law.'42 According to Chancellor Allen,
[a] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good
faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting sys-
tem, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that
failure to do so under some circumstance may, in theory at
least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-
compliance with applicable legal standards. 43
Caremark introduces Delaware's duty to monitor doctrine. The
duty emerges from Caremark's analysis and serves a crucial function
in preserving directors' accountability for risk management over-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 967.
139. Id. at 962.
140. Id. at 968.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Allen cited three reasons for this conclusion:
[I]n recent years the Delaware Supreme Court has made clear-especially in its juris-
prudence concerning takeovers . . .- the seriousness with which the corporation law
views the role of the corporate board. Secondly ... [the] fact that relevant and timely
information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the board's supervisory and
monitoring role ... [and] thirdly . .. the potential impact of the federal organiza-
tional sentencing guidelines on any business organization.
Id.
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sight. The Caremark court explained that a successful claim alleging
that directors breached their fiduciary duty to monitor requires
evidence that the board failed to act in good faith in implementing
systems to monitor the company's compliance with the law.'4 4 For
directors to be held personally liable, plaintiffs must establish that
the board "utter[ly] fail[ed] to attempt to assure a reasonable re-
porting system exists."04 5 Moreover, directors are only liable where
there is a "sustained or systemic failure of the board to exercise
oversight."1 4 6 Applying this standard to the plaintiffs' allegations in
Caremark, the court found that Caremark's directors were not per-
sonally liable. Caremark had appointed a committee to oversee
corporate compliance, instituted employee-training programs,
distributed ethics manuals to employees, and regularly reviewed
the company's legal compliance system. 47
For litigants, the Caremark decision was not only surprising be-
cause it challenged the high threshold for liability articulated by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Graham, but the decision also
seemed to revive duty of care claims that the Delaware state legisla-
ture intended to eliminate by statute. A few years prior to the
chancery court's decision in Caremark, the Delaware Assembly
amended Section 102(b) (7) of the state's corporations statute. The
newly adopted provision permits shareholders to amend corporate
charters to include a provision that exculpates directors from
claims for monetary damages in derivatives suits alleging that di-
rectors breached certain fiduciary duties. 148 However, under
Section 102(b) (7), shareholders may not amend the corporation's
charter in a manner that exculpates directors from claims alleging
that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty or allega-
tions that directors failed to act in good faith. 49
Subsequent to the adoption of Section 102(b) (7) and the Dela-
ware Chancery court's decision in Caremark, Delaware courts have
revisited the question raised in Caremark regarding the reach of
Section 102(b) (7). Does the incorporation of a Section 102(b) (7)
exculpation clause in a company's charter preclude all claims alleg-
ing directors breached their duties to monitor the business and
affairs of the company, claims historically resulting in monetary
damages? Does the duty to monitor encompass an obligation to
monitor activities beyond those expressly prohibited by law? Does a
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 971.
147. Id. at 962-63.
148. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (2010).
149. Id.
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claim alleging that a director breached her obligation to act in
good faith offer an independent basis for director liability, and if
so, what types of behavior constitute good faith conduct?
The court's decision in In re Walt Disney & Co. Derivative Litiga-
tion began to address a few of these questions, explaining that good
faith is not an independent basis for alleging that directors
breached their fiduciary duties. 5 0 According to the Disney court,
plaintiffs must demonstrate that directors failed to act in good faith
to establish that directors violated their fiduciary duties. However,
rather than adopting an explicit definition of good faith, Disney
offers a non-exhaustive list of the behavior that constitutes bad
faith. According to the Disney court:
[a] failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance,
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation,
where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable
positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in
the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties. 151
The Disney court introduced is a state-of-mind inquiry, establishing
that directors may only be liable where the directors had actual or
constructive knowledge that they were not discharging their fiduci-
ary obligations.
Despite its guidance regarding good faith, Disney did not clarify
whether the exculpation of duty of care claims under Section
102(b) (7) precluded both of the categories of duty of care claims
described in Caremark. Guttman v. Huang suggested that at least one
class of Caremark claims continues to offer plaintiffs a means to
hold directors accountable for their failure to monitor the compa-
ny's compliance with existing legal and regulatory obligations. In
Guttman, shareholders accused members of the board of failing to
monitor the company's compliance with accounting regulations.12
As a result, the company presented inaccurate financial infor-
mation to investors, creating liability for the company.
Although the claims described factual allegations consistent with
the plaintiffs' assertions (described as directors' violations of their
duty of care in Caremark), Vice Chancellor Strine recast the claims
as allegations that directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty.
150. In reXWalt Disney & Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).
151. Id. at 755.
152. Guttman v.Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 494 (Del. Ch. 2003).
153. Id.
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Vice Chancellor Strine opined that both fiduciary duty of loyalty
and Caremark claims premise liability on directors having con-
sciously disregarded their obligations, actions that demonstrate
bad faith.m
In a dramatic departure from precedent, the Guttman court ap-
plied the analysis historically applied to duty of loyalty claims to
plaintiffs' Caremark claims alleging directors failed to monitor the
company's business. According to Guttman, both Caremark claims
and duty of loyalty claims involve allegations that directors acted in
bad faith. If a court finds that the directors have acted in bad faith,
directors cannot argue that they acted in a manner consistent with
their obligations to perform their duties on behalf of the company
with the utmost fidelity. Moreover, Section 102(b) (7) expressly
prohibits the exculpation of claims alleging that directors acted in
bad faith. Consequently, shareholders may not exculpate directors
from Caremark claims that allege directors acted in bad faith even if
the relevant corporation has amended its charter to include a Sec-
tion 102(b) (7) exculpation clause. Prior to Guttman, scholars and
commentators assumed that the adoption of Section 102(b) (7)
precluded all duty of care claims because these claims seek mone-
tary damages. 5 - In a single opinion, the Delaware chancery court
resurrected oversight liability in the second category of Caremark
claims: claims alleging that directors failed to act in a manner con-
sistent with their monitoring duties.
Interpreting the directors' conscious disregard of their obliga-
tions to monitor the business and affairs of the firm as an act of
bad faith, Guttman subsumes Caremark claims under the standard
for evaluating duty of loyalty claims. By preserving monitoring
claims, this shift in the application of liability standard adjusts the
balance of power between shareholders who entrust the mainte-
nance and care of the businesses that they own to directors and the
directors who exercise authority to act on behalf of shareholders.
Directly challenging the state legislature's efforts to lower liability
standards through the adoption of Section 102(b) (7), Guttman
signals that shareholders may continue to use fiduciary claims to
hold directors accountable for failures to monitor the business's
compliance with legal and regulatory standards. However, because
it was a lower court opinion, Guttman's application remained
154. Id. at 506 ("Although the Caremark decision is rightly seen as a prod towards the
greater exercise of care by directors . . . the opinion articulates a standard for liability for
failures of oversight that requires a showing that the directors breached their duty of loyalty
by failing to attend to their duties in good faith.").
155. Id. at 502.
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uncertain until the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Stone v.
Ritter.
In Stone,"6 the Delaware Supreme Court offered a more precise
articulation of the shifting liability standard. The defendant direc-
tors in Stone faced allegations that they breached their fiduciary
obligations by failing to monitor and detect employees' violations
of federal and state banking laws. In response to government in-
vestigations of persistent violations of banking regulations and the
$50 million in fines and civil penalties assessed against AmSouth
Bancorporation, shareholders filed derivative litigation claims
seeking to hold directors personally liable for these corporate loss-
158es.
For the plaintiffs, Stone's interpretation of Caremark and its prog-
eny was both useful and limiting."5 Notwithstanding the Section
102(b) (7) provision exculpating directors for claims alleging
breaches of their fiduciary duty of care, the Stone court adopted
Guttman's characterization of the second category of Caremark
claims, concluding that these claims allege that directors have
breached their duty of loyalty.16 0 Facially, the decision signaled a
victory for plaintiffs seeking to bring derivative suits alleging that
directors breached their fiduciary duty to monitor. However, the
Stone court explained that, reading Disney and Caremark together,
the standard for oversight liability centers on demonstrating direc-
tors' failure to act in good faith. 6 ' Thus, Stone preserved
shareholders' ability to use derivative suits to hold directors per-
sonally liable for corporate losses resulting from directors' failure
to uphold their monitoring obligations, but required plaintiffs to
prove that directors acted in bad faith in their monitoring efforts.
The imposition of a scienter-based standard, however, severely lim-
its the likelihood that plaintiffs' claims would succeed.'6 2
While Stone clarified the court's approach to the second cate-
gory of Caremark claims, the application of the good faith and
loyalty analysis to allegations regarding directors' duty to monitor
and manage the corporation's affairs remained unresolved. Did the
scope of directors' duty encompass an obligation to monitor busi-
ness matters not expressly regulated under state or federal law, such
as management of financial, market, or credit risk management?
156. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369.
157. Id. at 364.
158. Id. at 371.
159. Id. at 369.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 977.
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The extreme distress experienced by financial institutions during
the recent financial crisis provided the courts with an opportunity
to clarify the scope of directors' duty to monitor.
B. The Case for Director Accountability for
Risk Management Monitoring
Part A argued that Delaware's fiduciary obligations standard re-
flects a highly deferential approach to evaluating directors' liability
for good faith decisions. However, even if such an approach seems
rational for most business decisions, there are normative questions
regarding the application of this standard to risk management de-
cisions. The events leading to the financial crisis motivated
litigation that raised further questions regarding the application of
Delaware's deferential standard to directors' risk management
oversight obligations.
In the wake of the crisis, Citigroup, Inc. shareholders initiated
a derivative suit alleging that directors breached their fiduciary
duties by failing to diligently monitor and manage the business's
risks related to the subprime mortgage market.13 Shareholders ar-
gued that the directors ignored "red flags" that warned of
widespread defaults in the subprime mortgage market and, conse-
quently, debilitating losses that left Citigroup nearly insolvent.16
While the court agreed that plaintiffs' allegations were Caremark
claims,'6 the court disagreed with plaintiffs' assertions regarding
the type of Caremark claims reflected in the Citigroup complaint.'66
In Caremark, Chancellor Allen explained that plaintiffs might as-
sert two different types of claims alleging that directors violated
their fiduciary duty to monitor the affairs of the business. First,
plaintiffs may allege that directors made a grossly negligent deci-
sion that led to corporate losses. 6 ' For this class of Caremark claims,
courts assume that judges are ill equipped to evaluate the sub-
stance of business decisions. 168Therefore, courts apply the business
163. The complaint alleged the defendant directors were liable for waste for allowing
the company to purchase $2.7 billion in subprime loans from mortgage originators; author-
izing a share repurchase program; approving an excessive compensation package for the
CEO, Charles Prince; and allowing the company to invest in structured investment vehicles
that invested in residential mortgage related assets.
164. In reCitigroup S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114 (Del. Ch. 2009).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. In reCaremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
168. See id. According to the Caremark Court:
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judgment rule, a deferential standard that presumes that directors'
decisions are informed, rational, and made in good faith. 6 9 The
business judgment rule avoids judicial second-guessing or hind-
sight bias that may occur if judges engage in after-the-fact
evaluations of the substance or content of directors' decisions.o
The business judgment rule protects directors' decisions in the
first group of claims as long as directors employ a rational process
in which all material information is given reasonable considera-
tion.7 As a result, the business judgment rule limits judges and
juries' evaluation of directors' decisions to an examination of the
board's process.1
Guttman and Stone illuminate the contours of the second catego-
ry of Caremark claims. The second category of Caremark claims
involves allegations that directors acted in bad faith by failing to
establish a compliance and reporting system or by failing to moni-
tor an existing compliance system. Because bad faith conduct is
inconsistent with actions that reflect loyalty, the Guttman and Stone
[W]hat should be understood, but may not widely be understood by courts or com-
mentators who are not often required to face such questions is that compliance with
a director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by refer-
ence to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed. That is, wheth-
er a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through "stupid" to "egregious"
or "irrational", provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court deter-
mines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort
to advance corporate interests. To employ a different rule-one that permitted an
"objective" evaluation of the decision-would expose directors to substantive second
guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious
to investor interests.
Id. See also Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director's Good Faith, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 457, 468 (2007).
169. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
170. See Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Gov-
ernance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1382-83 (2007) ("A justification of the business
judgment rule, which grants great deference even to catastrophic decisions, is that the rule
protects against hindsight bias. After all, litigation results only when corporate decisions
turn out badly, and courts are worried thatjudging decisions in this light might be especially
difficult given what seems like a reasonable business decision at time TI might seem fool-
hardy at time T2."); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1247 (2003).
171. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)
(holding that the business judgment rule protects directors if they have informed them-
selves "prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available
to them" and "then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties," and also finding
that during the decisionmaking process, the business judgment rule dictates that "director
liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.").
172. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also D. Gordon Smith, Chancellor Allen and the Funda-
mental Question, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577, 585 (1998).
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decisions describe claims involving bad faith conduct as allegations
that directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty. 7
Plaintiffs may demonstrate that directors acted in bad faith by
offering evidence that directors (a) utterly failed to assure that a
reasonable reporting or information system or controls existed, or
(b) having created such systems, the directors consciously failed to
monitor or oversee the operation of the program.174 By failing to
oversee the system or controls, directors limited their ability to re-
main informed regarding the risks or problems that most require
their attention.
As the Guttman court explained, the standard "premises liability
on a showing that the directors were conscious of the fact that they
were not doing their jobs."" The Citigroup court explained that
proving bad faith requires demonstrating that the directors' "inso-
lence was so persistent that it could not be ascribed to anything
other than a knowing decision not to even try to make sure the
corporation's officers had developed and were implementing a
prudent approach to ensuring compliance with law.",7 6
The Citigroup court posited that a scienter-based standard in the
second category of Caremark claims the Delaware legislature's in-
tent under Section 102(b) (7) to limit directors' liability for claims
alleging that they breached their fiduciary oversight obligations.177
The court addressed plaintiffs' claims in the context of defendant
directors' motion to dismiss the derivative suit for failure to
properly plead demand futility.78
173. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362, 369 (Del. 2006); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007).
174. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123-24.
175. Id. at 123 n.46 (citing Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506).
176. Id. at 123 n.47 (citing Desimone, 924 A.2d at 935).
177. Id. (citing Desimone, 924 A.2d at 935 ("Caremark itself encouraged directors to act
with reasonable diligence, but plainly held that director liability for failure to monitor re-
quired a finding that the directors acted with the state of mind traditionally used to define
the mindset of a disloyal director-bad faith-because their indolence was so persistent that
it could not be ascribed to anything other than a knowing decision not to even try to make
sure the corporation's officers had developed and were implementing a prudent approach
to ensuring law compliance. By reinforcing that a scienter-based standard applies to claims
in the delicate monitoring context, Stone ensured that the protections that exculpatory char-
ter provisions afford to independent directors against damage claims would not be
eroded.")).
178. Id. at 112. Citigroup was a derivative suit brought by shareholders on behalf of the
corporation seeking to enforce directors' and officers' fiduciary obligations. Id. at 111. Del-
aware requires plaintiffs bringing derivative suits to make demand on the board of directors,
asking the directors to bring the claim and direct the litigation. Under Section 141(a) of
Delaware General Corporations law, the board of directors exercises authority over the
business and affairs of the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008). The
boards' authority includes the decision to initiate a law suit on behalf of the corporation.
The procedural requirement for demand may be excused and plaintiff shareholders may
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Citigroup plaintiffs claimed that directors failed to manage finan-
cial, market, and credit risks related to the subprime mortgage
market and the securitization industry."9 Plaintiffs argued that di-
rectors failed to make a good faith effort to follow procedures
designed to assure that directors would "be fully informed regard-
ing Citigroup's risk exposure to the subprime mortgage market."
Plaintiffs in Citigroup argued that directors' decisions ignored "red
flags," related to the subprime mortgage market. As described in
Part II, Citigroup amassed a $55 billion credit derivatives portfolio,
ignoring warnings by risk managers from across the financial ser-
vices industry."' In 2007, the mounting losses propelled Citigroup
toward insolvency.'12 According to the shareholders' complaint,
directors and officers ignored these warnings in "pursuit of short
term profit."..
The Citigroup plaintiffs argued that these "red flags" signaled a
precipitous decline in the mortgage backed securities market. 4
Directors' behavior, plaintiffs argued, was antithetical to their obli-
gations to monitor and manage risks.'8 5
The Citigroup complaint clearly reflected plaintiffs' intent to al-
lege directors' breached duties in the second category of Caremark
claims. Citigroup's shareholders argued that directors acted in bad
faith and consciously disregarded their duties. The complaint al-
leged that managers knew or should have known that certain business
practices, particularly those relating to the bank's participation in
the subprime mortgage market and the credit derivatives market,
created a threat that the business might experience debilitating
losses.18 6
Looking "past the lofty allegations of duties of oversight and red
flags used to dress up their claims," Chancellor Chandler ex-
proceed with their claims if they demonstrate that demand is futile. Common law provides
that demand would be futile if plaintiffs may raise a reasonable doubt that "(1) the directors
are disinterested and independent [or] (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the
product of a valid exercise of business judgment." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. Where share-
holders' claims do not challenge a business decision and instead the complaint alleges that
directors' inaction resulted in losses, then the plaintiff shareholders may demonstrate de-
mand futility by pleading particularized facts that "create a reasonable doubt that, as of the
time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly exercised its inde-
pendent and disinterested business judgment." Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34
(Del. 1993).
179. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123.
180. Id.
181. See supra Part H.A.
182. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 115 n.6.
183. Id. at 111.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 111.
186. Id. at 121-23.
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plained that the shareholders' claims aimed to hold directors per-
sonally liable "for making (or allowing to be made) business
decisions that, in hindsight, turned out poorly for the Company."'8 7
Allegations that directors made bad business decisions fall into the
first category of Caremark claims. Chancellor Chandler concluded
that Citigroup shareholders' claims fell within the first group of
claims. The court then evaluated the claims under the standard of
liability applicable to the first category of Caremark claims, invoked
the business judgment rule, and swiftly dismissed the claims.
After its re-characterization of Citigroup plaintiffs' claims, the
court examined, in great detail, the purported "red flags" that
signaled Citigroup's impending losses. Pointing to Citigroup's cre-
ation of an audit and risk committee and the company's decision
to appoint financial experts to serve on the committee, Chancellor
Chandler concluded that plaintiffs' allegations of "red flags" did
not offer evidence of any wrongdoing."" According to the court,
Citigroup's layered internal review policies and its long-standing
efforts to manage risk through designated committees undermined
plaintiffs' claims that the company lacked proper information sys-
tems and controls.'89 The evidence of so-called red flags offered by
Citigroup plaintiffs-media articles, economists' predictions about
the market, credit rating agencies' decision to downgrade credit
assets in Citigroup's portfolio of mortgage-backed assets, and con-
tinuing mark-downs of the value of Citigroup's portfolio-did not
demonstrate that the directors intentionally disregarded their
oversight responsibilities.o
The reason for the careful review of the alleged red flags is
not quite clear. Chancellor Chandler's earlier conclusions regard-
ing the application of the business judgment rule and the
application of the exculpation clause each offered a reasonable
basis for disposition of the shareholders' claims. One commentator
argues that Chancellor Chandler includes the discussion to "leave
open the possibility that, in an appropriate case, a board might be
subject to liability under Caremark for failing to monitor the corpo-
ration's business risk."'9 ' If Caremark claims allege that the board
failed to monitor the company's business risk, the claims are not
barred as a matter of law and state corporate law continues to offer
187. Id. at 123.
188. Id. at 128.
189. See id. at 127.
190. Id. at 128.
191. Robert T. Miller, The Board's Duty to Monitor Risk After Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L.
1153, 1159 (2010).
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a mechanism for shareholders to hold directors liable for risk
management oversight.
On the other hand, in the absence of a mechanism to ensure
accountability for fiduciary duty claims under state corporate law
for ERM failures, there may be limited mechanisms for sharehold-
ers to hold directors accountable for violating their oversight
obligations. When we consider the innovative developments in so-
phisticated financial products described in Part I along with the
Delaware courts' high bar for establishing director liability for
breach of the fiduciary duty to monitor risk taking, there is just
cause for concern about financial institutions' risk-taking decisions
and the stability of financial markets. Delaware's approach severely
weakens accountability for failed risk management oversight and
leaves shareholders vulnerable to managerial inattention to risk
concerns. Moreover, noting that Congress and federal regulators
are often reticent to adopt corporate governance measures, the
absence of an effective state corporate law remedy may leave
shareholders without an appropriate tool for enforcing directors'
fiduciary obligations to monitor risk management oversight.
III. WELL-CRAFTED AND BETTER-DRAFTED?: FEDERAL REGULATION
OF RISK MANAGEMENT THROUGH DISCLOSURE AND
SUBSTANTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS
While Delaware courts' approach to determining director liabil-
ity for risk management oversight serves as one source of authority,
federal regulators may also impose reforms that aim to encourage
careful risk management and discourage excessive risk taking. Dur-
ing the recent financial crisis, ERM failures at systemically
significant financial institutions prompted federal regulators to
adopt sweeping federal regulatory reforms designed to enhance
risk management oversight in financial markets. In 2008, Congress
adopted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which includ-
ed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and other measures
designed to stabilize the economy. A year later, in 2009, Congress
passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.'93 These leg-
islative acts, together with the Dodd-Frank Act, adopted on July 21,
2010, represent Congress's most pervasive efforts to regulate risk in
financial markets through corporate governance reforms.
192. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101 (a) (1),
122 Stat. 3765 [hereinafter EESA].
193. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001 (a) (2)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221(a) (3) (2011)) [hereinafter ARRA].
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The Dodd-Frank Act introduces two types of regulatory reform:
disclosure-oriented reform and substantive corporate governance
reforms. The latter reforms are significant because, as Part II ex-
plains, regulation of corporate governance is traditionally a
province of state law. The Dodd-Frank Act introduces federal cor-
porate governance obligations for companies subject to periodic
reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and systemically significant financial institutions; the latter group is
even required to appoint a special board committee designated to
monitor and manage risks.194 Based on the presumption that risk
management and risk mitigation concerns are best addressed
through corporate governance reforms, the Dodd-Frank Act en-
hances oversight obligations through corporate governance
mechanisms. The Act includes provisions that aim to reduce sys-
temic risk, as well as provisions to address the conflicts of interest
and personal incentives that directors and officers may have to take
unreasonable or excessive risks.
Three classes of insiders, inside directors, executive officers, and
employees face critical conflicts of interest and incentives that may
motivate undesirable, excessive risk taking. Compensation for ex-
ecutive officers who serve as inside directors and other senior
management employees is often awarded based on the valuation of
the company's stock or the price at which the company's shares
trade on a national exchange. Executive officers and senior man-
agement employees, therefore, have personal incentives to ensure
that accounting statements and other material disclosures, includ-
ing the company's disclosure of VaR or other risk measuring
methods, encourage the market to value the company's stock at or
above a particular price. Executives who act as inside directors in-
fluence the development of risk management policy as members of
the board. These executives, through their supervisory authority
over non-management employees, also influence the implementa-
tion of corporate risk management policies. The link between
compensation and risk-taking creates a continuous conflict of in-
terest for executive officers. If financial institutions fail to manage
these conflicts effectively, insiders' incentives may lead to excessive
risk-taking, enterprise risk management failures, and possibly, the
realization of systemic risk concerns.
194. See infra Part III.B., Part IV.C.1.
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A. Disclosure-Oriented, Stakeholder-Centered Reforms
The risk management reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act attempt to
address the conflicts of interest and incentives that create enter-
prise and systemic risks through conventional and more creative
approaches to securities regulation. Several provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act emphasize the importance of disclosure as a method for
reducing information asymmetries. Executive officers and directors
have intimate, real-time knowledge of a business's actual economic
position; this advantage may tempt some insiders to exploit their
positions for personal gain.'9 ' In contrast, shareholders or potential
investors receive information in delayed-time; they lack access to
information until it is disclosed to the public.
The Dodd-Frank Act introduces additional disclosure require-
ments aimed to address the disclosure gap. Section 956 of the
Dodd-Frank Act requires financial institutions to disclose any incen-
tive-based executive compensation arrangements that encourage
excessive risk-taking or that may lead to a material financial loss. 96
Consistent with the statute's systemic risk-reducing objectives, the
Dodd-Frank Act amends Section 14 of the Exchange Act and
enhances proxy statement disclosure obligations for reporting com-
panies. While the Exchange Act required certain general executive
compensation disclosures prior to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the newly introduced reforms require reporting companies to
disclose the relationship between the performance of the company's
equity shares and the CEO's compensation (pay versus perfor-
mance)... and to provide a description of the median annual
compensation of all employees (excluding the CEO), the annual
total compensation paid to the CEO, and a ratio comparing the two
199measures.
Acknowledging the increasingly significant role of derivatives in
financial markets, section 955 amends Section 14 of the Exchange
Act to require reporting companies to disclose their internal poli-
cies regarding employees', executives', and directors' use of
derivatives or other financial products designed to hedge their ex-
posure to a decline in the value of the company's shares.200 Finally,
reporting companies must disclose whether the company has
195. Insiders as used in this Article refers to the directors and executive officers who are
employees of a company.
196. Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (a) (i).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at § 953.
200. Id. at § 955.
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adopted policies to recover incentive-based compensation awarded
to executives based on accounting statements that are later re-
vealed to contain errors.o1
Managing executives' incentives to take appropriate risks through
executive compensation policies is critical to financial institutions'
ability to manage risk successfully.2 02 Consistent with basic principles
of entrepreneurialism, financial institutions reward employees when
their risk-taking activities on behalf of the business generate profits.
Compensation arrangements organized around benefiting success-
ful risk-taking may create incentives for executives and other
employees to take imprudent and excessive risks. Employees and
executives benefit if their risk-taking activities are profitable, but may
not face any consequences if the risks result in losses that harm the
long-term health of the business.202 The enhanced disclosure man-
dates reflect legislators' presumption that increasing transparency
through disclosure of compensation policies clarifies whether execu-
tives face consequences when they engage in excessive or poorly
calculated risk-taking activities. Disclosure reduces information
asymmetries and reveals financial institutions and other reporting
companies' efforts to manage risk through careful risk management
oversight. 04
Unfortunately, there is no statutory definition for one of the
most important elements in Congress's risk-reducing paradigm-
excessive risk-taking. Regulators of financial institutions and other
reporting companies subject to disclosure requirements must de-
termine how to interpret "excessive" risk-taking. Delegating the
authority to regulated entities and regulators makes sense because
there is no single, one-size-fits-all method to ensure successful risk
management.
The absence of a statutory definition, however, creates room for
interested parties to influence regulators and weaken the effect of
the reforms. Moreover, there may be gaps between the adoption of
executive compensation polices, amendments to existing policies,
the implementation of these policies, and the public disclosure of
relevant information.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (2011).
202. Proposed Rule to Implement Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act, available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/doddfrank956proposedruledraft.pdf.
203. Id.
204. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984). Disclosures strengthen the integrity of the
marketplace and, among other benefits, foster greater stability and militate against systemic
risks.
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As the discussion in Part I regarding the use of VaR models and
the development of Monte Carlo simulations and stress tests ex-
plains, risk management decisions are time-sensitive. Disclosing
information only periodically-typically on a quarterly or annual
basis-often leaves investors with very limited and likely stale
information regarding risk management. Because of the intense
competition among financial institutions engaged in investing,
underwriting, lending, and other business activities subject to
financial market risks, financial institutions are unlikely to dis-
close any information beyond that which is required; therefore, it
is unclear that the provisions will have the intended transparency-
enhancing effect.
Finally, similar to other federal disclosure obligations, the disclo-
sure-oriented reforms in the Dodd-Frank Act create expenses for
the companies subject to the Exchange Act. Commentators also
argue that compliance with disclosure-oriented reforms frustrates
businesses because there is often little evidence that the required
disclosure will effectively address Congress's risk management con-
cerns.20 Fortunately, Congress had a second tool available to
address risk management concerns: substantive corporate govern-
ance reforms.
B. Much Ado About Nothing: Substantive Governance Reforms
Many of the disclosure mandates in the Dodd-Frank Act are ac-
companied by parallel corporate governance reforms that change
either a structural or organizational attribute of the board of direc-
tors. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act directs federal regulators to
direct national securities exchanges to impose listing rules requir-
ing companies whose securities are traded on the exchange to
appoint only independent directors to any board committee des-
ignated to adopt compensation policies. 206 Moreover, the statute
expressly tasks these board committees with the authority to decide
207
salaries for executives, directors, and other employees.
Section 956, which requires disclosure of incentive-based execu-
tive compensation policies, also prohibits financial institutions
from adopting incentive-based compensation policies that encour-
age excessive risk-taking that may lead to a material financial loss. 208
"Say-on-pay" mandates accompany the executive compensation
205. See generally, Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 1801-1802
206. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3(f) (2011).
207. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2011).
208. Dodd-Frank Act§ 951(a)(i).
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disclosures in Section 951 that require reporting companies to in-
clude a resolution in their annual proxy statements granting
shareholders the authority to participate in an advisory, non-
binding vote on executive compensation awards. 2"9 Reporting
companies must also include a resolution indicating whether votes
on the say-on-pay resolutions will occur every one, two, or three
years and a resolution on the frequency of the say-on-pay votes at
least once every six years.21o Finally, Section 951 requires a non-
binding, advisory shareholder vote on any golden parachute ar-
rangements related to mergers and acquisitions."
Section 971 grants shareholders greater ability to influence the
information contained in companies' annual proxy statements.
Under recently adopted Rule 14a-11, the SEC now requires com-
panies to include shareholders' nominees along with the
incumbent directors and managements' nominees for board seats
available during any board election.212 Rule 14a-11 allows share-
holders to nominate board candidates for election if the
shareholder owns at least three percent of the company's shares
and has continuously owned at least three percent of the compa-
ny's shares for the prior three years.1 While companies subject to
the rule cannot opt-out, Rule 14a-1 1 does not apply if a company's
bylaws or the law of the company's state of incorporation prohibits
shareholders from nominating directors. Under the proposed
rule, shareholders would be able to nominate the greater of one
nominee or up to 25 percent of the total board seats.
There is skepticism about the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank
Act's substantive corporate governance reforms. While these
shareholder-centric reforms strengthen shareholders' authority in
the balance of power between shareholders and directors and of-
ficers, it is unclear whether these reforms will, in fact, impact risk
management in the manner that Congress intended. For example,
say-on-pay votes presumably give shareholders a more significant
voice in determining executive compensation, an area described
above as critical to effective risk management. However, the
209. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1, [hereinafter Exchange
Act].
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2011).
211. Exchange Act § 14A(b)(1).
212. A shareholder must own at least 3 percent of the company's shares at the time that
she proposes director nominees and she must have owned 3 percent of the company's
shares for the period beginning three years prior to the submission of the nominees and the
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say-on-pay vote is merely advisory and nonbinding. It does not ac-
tually increase shareholders' authority over executive compensation.
Consequently, the provision is largely symbolic.
Moreover, empirical studies cast doubt on the efficacy of say-on-
pay reforms. Empirical studies evaluating say-on-pay voting policies
adopted in other jurisdictions suggest that increasing the opportu-
nities for shareholders to participate in director elections does not
necessarily lead to more meaningful shareholder participation. 6
Jeffrey Gordon's study examining the effects of say-on-pay ar-
rangements in the United Kingdom indicates that shareholder
approval votes have limited influence on executive compensa-
tion.217 Though there is some evidence that say-on-pay votes
encourage modest reforms, shareholders almost always approve
proposed executive compensation packages.218 It is even less clear
that say-on-pay votes have any effect on or enhance risk manage-
ment oversight.
In addition, there is little evidence that reforms altering board
organization, such as requiring boards to appoint compensation
committees comprised of only independent board members,
reduce undesirable risk-taking. Prior to the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, the national securities exchanges imposed requirements
regarding composition of listed companies compensation commit-
tees.2" For example, Section 303A.01 of the New York Stock
Exchange Listed Companies Manual requires listed companies to
appoint only independent directors to their compensation com-
2201
mittees. Section 5605(d) of NASDAQ's listing standards requires
listed companies to appoint independent directors to a majority of
the positions on the compensation committee.22 ' Thus, the Dodd-
Frank Act's provisions addressing compensation committee com-
position are redundant. The exchanges had already adopted
relevant listing company requirements addressing these particular
222
corporate governance concerns.
216. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is 'Say On Pay'Justified?, 32 REGULATION 42, 45 (2009).
217. Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Say on Pay": Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case
for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009).
218. David McCann, Say What? The Battle Over Executive Comp, CFO.COM, June 4, 2008,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/ 11485334/c_2984338/?f=archives.
219. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2009),
available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com.
220. Id.
221. NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES, Listing Rule § 5605(d) (2009), availa-
ble at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/.
222. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010).
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More importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that appoint-
ing a wholly independent compensation committee will ensure
better risk management.2" In a recent article, Lisa Fairfax offers
thoughtful reflections regarding the fallacy of assuming that ap-
pointing independent directors leads to inherently better
outcomes.224 The reason for this may be, at least in part, that the
definition of "independence" is elusive; cognitive biases limit direc-
tors' ability to act or make decisions in a manner consistent with a
theoretical perception of independence.' Moreover, the results of
empirical studies examining the influence of independent direc-
221
tors on board's decision-making process are inconclusive.
The impact of proxy access reforms may be similarly disappoint-
ing. Ensuring that shareholders have greater influence regarding
the content of annual proxy statements presumably allows share-
holders to exercise greater authority in electing those who serve on
the company's board of directors. Empirical studies reveal that
efforts to upset incumbent directors are typically unsuccessful.
Studies suggest that in contests, incumbent directors will grant
221
concessions to shareholders in order to retain their board seats.
Even after the Dodd-Frank Act reforms to increase shareholders'
ability to nominate directors, the probability that shareholders will
succeed in getting their candidates elected is extremely low.
Moreover, even if shareholders succeed in placing candidates on
the slate, it is unlikely that shareholder candidates will capture a
majority or even a significant minority of seats on the board.
Shareholders' selective targeting of directors also suggests that
their efforts will not prompt a removal of the entire board in any
given election or even a significant number of incumbent direc-
tors.2 29 As one commentator notes, because the Dodd-Frank Act
long-debated reforms, the statute's impact will be uneventful:
223. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition
and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 923 (1999).
224. See Lisa Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IowA L. REv. 127 (2010).
225. Id. at 135.
226. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 223, at 924-26; Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White,
CEO Compensation and Turnover- The Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 935, 936 (2003); Idalene F. Kesner, Bart Victor & Bruce T. Lamont, Board Composition
and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies, 29 AcAD. MGMT. J.
789, 794-96 (1986).
227. See Bainbridge, supra note 216, at 157.
228. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 678, 688-694
(2007).
229. Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 309, 332-334 (2011).
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"there is nothing even remotely radical about anything in these"
reforms."3
Legislators, regulators, and commentators often assume that ad-
dressing the specific issues that emerged during the recent crisis is
sufficient to prevent a future crisis. Unfortunately, this approach is
often frustrating because regulation chases market innovation and
merely offers reforms that react to the catalysts of the last financial
market disruption. Instead reforms should be agile, and that ad-
dress forward-looking concerns. The measures introduced in the
Dodd-Frank Act offer limited reforms specifically enhancing finan-
cial institutions' enterprise and systemic risk oversight. The
reforms continue to rely significantly on the board of directors to
manage executives' conflicts between their own self-interests in
obtaining incentive-based compensation and risk management
oversight.
At the heart of the reforms adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act are
several ineffective attempts to address boards' oversight of enter-
prise risk management. For the reasons noted in this Section, there
are concerns that the recently adopted federal legislation will fail
to accomplish its risk-reducing goals. The next Part offers a pro-
posal for addressing the gaps in the proposed reforms. The
proposal suggests reforms that would leverage the benefits of rely-
ing on the board as the leadership and authority of systemically
significant financial institutions while addressing the unresolved
but critical issues that undermine the effectiveness of boards' deci-
sion-making processes: cognitive biases and structural dynamics.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: APPLYING LESSONS FROM
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
LITERATURE To RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATION
The recent financial crisis renewed the debate over the effec-
tiveness of federal corporate governance reforms. Parts II and III
explored state and federal efforts to regulate risk management
oversight and argued that state corporate law generally defers to
directors' judgment regarding risk management policies. Federal
efforts to enhance risk governance, similar to legislation and regu-
lation responding to other financial market disruptions, provide
organizational reforms that altered the structure and composition
230. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, A Dubious Way to Prevent Fiscal Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2010,
at B ("[T] here is nothing even remotely radical about anything in these bills.").
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of the board of directors.2 3 ' However, neither regulatory approach
reaches the more fundamental concerns inherent in boards' deci-
sion-making processes. Consequently, the reforms are unlikely to
achieve intended risk management oversight goals.
This Part addresses the benefits and weaknesses of group deci-
sion-making. After exploring the promise and peril of group
decision-making, this Part posits that organizational reforms must
respond to shortcomings in risk management governance, namely,
the impact of cognitive biases and structural limitations on group
decision-making processes. Moreover, this Part contends that a more
effective regulatory approach involves comprehensive risk govern-
ance implemented by each authority that influences corporate
governance-federal and state regulatory authorities, self-regulatory
organizations, and the contractual arrangement embodied in state
corporate charters.
A. The Promise of Group Decision-Making
Boards of directors serve as mediating hierarchies or gatekeep-
232
ers, balancing shareholder interests and management incentives.
State law authorizes boards to monitor and manage a company's
business performance, offer advice and counsel to executive
officers, and establish the objectives, goals, and policies that gov-
ern business activities."' As an international committee on
banking supervision recently observed, the board of directors of
financial institutions serves a uniquely important role, creating an
important "check" among the "checks and balances" that ensure
the safety and soundness of banks' operations and risk manage-
ment oversight. 23 4 In turn, effective ERM at individual financial
institutions reduces the threat of systemic risk.
Academic literature, common law, and statutes reflect a pre-
sumption that the board engages in a deliberative decision-making
process. As Part II explains, state corporate law and judicial
231. See e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2006)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
232. Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate
Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1267 (2000).
233. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010) ("The business and affairs of every cor-
poration ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors"). The
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance reflects similar designs. See
AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.02(a)(2)-(3)(1992).
234. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FOR BANKING ORGANISATIONS 13 (2006).
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precedent employ a deferential standard of review when evaluating
board decisions in derivative litigation as long as the board makes
rational, well-informed decisions in good faith. Relying on boards
may, in fact, lead to better decisions for corporations. Experi-
mental psychologists and behavioral economists' research suggests
that aggregating a group of individuals' knowledge, interests, and
skills leads to qualitatively better decisions than relying on the de-
236cisions made by the average individual group member.
The decisions that we make as individuals are subject to inher-
ent cognitive limitations. As individuals, we have limited expertise,
memory, and analytical and computational abilities. Individuals have
a natural tendency to overestimate the quality of their own judg-
ments and abilities."' Group deliberative processes overcome the
bounded rationality that limits an individual's decision-making pro-
cess.13" Groups tend to commit fewer errors and discover more
mistakes than the average individual group member.2"
The benefits of group decision-making assume that groups en-
gage in an honest, robust exchange of ideas.m When groups
engage in candid decision-making processes, the groups benefit
from the rich diversity of talents, strengths, ideas, and personal and
professional experiences of their members.241
There is also a compelling efficiency rationale for adopting a
collective decision-making process.4 For a business to gain the best
outcome when a task is assigned, it may be difficult to identify the
individual who will outperform her peers in advance of the task. A
group decision-making process offers the benefit of capturing the
skills of the strongest member of the group without the necessity of
having to identify the strongest member at the outset. However, the
presumed attributes and benefits often fail to materialize and in-
stead, group decision-making engenders a number of concerns.
235. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, Are Two Heads Better than One?: An Experimental
Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking 15 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7909, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7909.
236. See e.g., Blinder & Morgan, supra note 235, at 15; see also RobertJ. Haft, Business De-
cisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MicH. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1981).
For a survey of experiments, see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmak-
ing in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (2002) (surveying several experimental
studies and noting the conclusions demonstrating the benefits of group decision making as
well as the weaknesses in the experiments); Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Group-
think and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1179 (2010).
237. Bainbridge, supra note 236, at 11.
238. Leslie, supra note 236, at 1190.
239. Blinder et al., supra note 235, at 5.
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B. The Limitations of Group Decision-Making
Studies by behavioral economists reveal that several significant
cognitive biases and other structural dynamics may influence the
243
effectiveness of deliberative, group decision-making processes. In
the context of boards of directors, the impact of cognitive biases
and structural dynamics create notable limitations.4 For boards of
directors at systemically significant financial institutions and other
financial services intermediaries, these limits may lead to perilous
consequences, including ERM failures, insolvency, or market dis-
ruption.
Four significant cognitive biases-commitment bias, confirma-
tion bias, overconfidence, and structural bias-limit group
decision-making processes and pose significant problems for com-
plex financial institutions. First, the theory of commitment bias
posits that people have a natural propensity to identify information
that supports a previously adopted strategy or course of action.2 4"
Once a person has chosen a course of action, commitment bias
suggests that the person will continue to act in a manner consistent
with the chosen course even if later discovered information sug-
gests that one should follow a different course.4 Commitment bias
may make it difficult for a director to appreciate evidence that her
decisions or the group's earlier decisions were misguided.
Second, confirmation bias describes a tendency to disregard in-
formation that contradicts an established conclusion and
unconsciously gravitate to information that confirms a previously
articulated opinion.4 Because of confirmation bias, groups will
perceive information as supporting earlier decisions where an ob-
jective review of the same information suggests cause to question,
re-evaluate, or abandon earlier conclusions.2 4 8 Confirmation bias
243. See e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 499 (2002).
244. See id.
245. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
921,936 (2007).
246. Id.
247. See supra Leslie, note 236, at 1191-92 (surveying the literature examining confir-
mation bias including the experiments and conclusions explored in Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175
(1998);J. Edward Russo et al., The Distortion of Information During Decisions, 66 Org. Behav. &
Hum. Decision Processes 102, 107-08 (1996); David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating
Causality: Attributional Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
892, 892-93 (1993)).
248. See id.
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leads an individual or group to disregard information that contra-
dicts their perceptions and established conclusions.2 4 9
Third, overconfidence bias describes a tendency to overestimate
2 1
a group's abilities or the abilities of the leadership of a group. s
Overconfidence leads group members to defer to leadership with-
out rigorously debating the issue and to adopt overly optimistic
opinions regarding the performance of group leaders.5 Overcon-
252
fidence compromises objective decision-making.
Fourth, structural bias impedes a director's ability to exercise ob-
jective judgment in circumstances that involve persons with whom a
director has a relationship.5 Board members are generally selected
from a small pool of qualified candidates.5 The small pool of direc-
tor candidates also suggests that directors will likely participate in
similar educational and professional circles and share multiple
affiliations with one another.2 ' Drawing from a limited pool of quali-
fied candidates often ensures that board members will have
relationships with other board members prior to serving on a
board.5  Or, through their service, board members may develop
intimate personal relationships with one another.
These relational ties and affiliations stymie board members' abil-
ity to evaluate one another's opinions and actions objectively.
Structural bias refers to the tendency of group members to aban-
249. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance,
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 680 (2005).
250. See Leslie, supra note 236, at 1183 ("Board members' preferences for consensus,
approval, and group solidarity can intensify the effect of pre-existing biases that impede
rational decision-making, such as confirmation bias, ingroup bias, and overconfidence in
one"s ability to act fairly.").
251. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 803 (2001).
252. See Leslie, supra note 236, at 1183.
253. See Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REv. 237, 250 (2009); see also Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Re-
view, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 821, 824 (2004) (explaining that the "term 'structural bias' generally
refers to the prejudice that members of the board of directors may have in favor of one
another and of management"). Courts have also acknowledged the influence of structural
bias. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-51 (Del. 2004) (indicating that structural bias
"presupposes that the professional and social relationships that naturally develop among
members of a board impede independent decision-making").
254. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 810 n.60 (2001)
(citing James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 103-04 (1985)).
255. See generally In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(exploring the influence of bias created by professional, educational and board service affil-
iations and indicating that "motives like love, friendship, and collegiality" impede
objectivity); Leslie, supra note 236, at 859.
256. See generally Oracle, 824 A.2d at 938.
257. See id.
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don their own individual perceptions regarding a particular issue
and adopt an opinion that is the group consensus on the matter
even if they possess information that conflicts with or contradicts
the group's opinion.2'8 Because of structural bias, interactions and
affiliations outside the boardroom may color board members' abil-
ity to engage in the rigorous debate necessary to generate the
benefits of deliberative decision-making.'" Consequently, structural
bias may limit the effectiveness of group decision-making.
Structural dynamics may further deteriorate objective decision-
making by reinforcing cognitive biases. According to scholars,
"herding" can amplify the effects of cognitive biases.'" Herding
describes the tendency of group members to adopt the decisions of
other members in a group, disregarding information in their pos-
session or even their own judgments that may be contrary to the
group's opinion.2 ' The group may defer to the judgment of a dom-
262
inant board member who is perceived as better informed. In
other instances, a board member may free-ride on the information
offered by another board member in an effort to appear to be
team player that can "get-along."2 6' Board members herding be-
hind a popular or dominant perspective undermine the benefits of
group decision-making, leading to less effective, sub-optimal deci-
sions.
C. Altering the Regulations to Improve Group Decision-Making
As described in Parts II and III above, both state and federal au-
thorities currently regulate corporate governance. However, the
258. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L. .
821 (2004); Page, supra note 253, at 250.
259. Seidenfeld, supra note 243, at 486.
260. Id.; see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1233, 1239 (2003); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corpo-
rate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347,
348, 353-56 (1996); see generally Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 639, 645-53 (1999); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERN-
ANCE 37 (1996).
261. Bainbridge, supra note 236; Scotland M. Duncan, The Empirics of Governance and
Fraud, 70 U. Prrr. L. REV. 465, 474 (2009).
262. Bainbridge, supra note 236, at 31; Scotland M. Duncan, The Empirics of Governance
and Fraud, 70 U. PIrr. L. REV. 465, 474 (2009) ("Faced with complexity and uncertainty,
outside directors 'who perceive themselves as having limited information and who can ob-
serve the actions of presumptively better-informed persons may attempt to free ride by
following' the CEO's decisions.").
263. Marleen A. O'Connor, Women Executives in Gladiator Corporate Cultures: The Behavior-
al Dynamics of Gender Ego, and Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 465, 497 (2006); Melanie B. Leslie, The
Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1190 (2010).
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earlier analysis reveals that two additional authorities also influence
corporate governance-self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and
the corporate charter that establishes the rights of the owners and
the responsibilities and obligations of directors and executive of-
ficers. Each of these authorities influences aspects of the board's
decision-making processes. This Section contends that each
authority that influences corporate governance should structure
regulatory obligations in a manner that leverages the benefits of
group decision-making while mitigating the impact of cognitive
biases and structural dynamics.
1. Federal Regulation
Part III examined federal regulators' efforts to reduce enter-
prise and systemic risk through corporate governance reforms in
the newly adopted Dodd-Frank Act. Federal authorities' use of
structural and composition board reforms aims to address executive
officers and inside directors' incentives and the conflicts of interest
that may lead to undesirable risk-taking. However, there are more
direct approaches to board reforms that consider cognitive biases
and structural dynamics of board relationships. To enhance ERM at
systemically significant financial institutions and reduce systemic
risk, Congress could have imposed a federally-enforceable fiduciary
obligation for directors to develop and monitor risk management
oversight systems.
The creation of a federal fiduciary duty to oversee risk manage-
ment would require federal regulators to develop corporate
governance liability standards, further extending federal authority
into a province traditionally regulated by state law. While federal
regulators have extensive experience regulating liability standards
and monitoring compliance, commentators correctly note that
there are benefits to permitting state legislatures and courts to
serve as laboratories of experimentation or a forum for the debate
and development of fiduciary obligation standards.m
The Dodd-Frank Act does not include a specific mechanism for
federal regulators to increase oversight of risk management poli-
cies at large, complex financial institutions. Under Section 165(h)
of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress authorizes the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve to implement regulations requiring
certain financial institutions to create risk management commit-
264. See e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 120, at 145.
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tees.265 The risk management committees must include at least one
risk management expert with experience assessing and managing
risk exposures of large, complex financial institutions.
Through the development of regulations for risk committees,
the Federal Reserve will attempt to ensure that systemically signifi-
cant financial institutions create and maintain appropriate risk
management policies. The Federal Reserve may also impose com-
mittee composition requirements that reduce the influence of
cognitive biases. For example, requiring external review of risk
management decisions by an independent, risk management con-
sultant and requiring the committee to explain in a formal
meeting with the full board its decisions to adopt or dismiss the
recommendations of the independent consultant may reduce
overconfidence, confirmation, and commitment biases. In addi-
tion, including an expert on risk management methodologies on
the risk management committee will enhance the committee's un-
derstanding of complex quantitative financial models. The
committee will be better able to detect manipulation or errors in
the application of quantitative models such as VaR, Monte Carlo
simulations, and stress tests.
Finally, the risk management committee may adopt policies re-
garding internal reporting that further enhance risk management
oversight and reduce the influence of cognitive biases and struc-
tural dynamics. The committee may insist on the appointment of a
chief risk officer and require the officer to present periodic reports
directly to the committee. To protect against conflicts of interest
and inappropriate personal incentives, the risk management
committee and the compensation committee should collaborate
to ensure that the chief risk officer's compensation is determined
in a manner that is not correlated to the value of the firm's equity
securities, the size of dividends, profitability, or other measures
that may create incentives to engage in undesirable risk-taking.
2. State Regulation
States are already well-positioned to improve risk management
regulation by enhancing group decision-making. For example,
Citigroup points to an opportunity for Delaware courts to articu-
late a clear standard regarding directors' fiduciary obligations to
carry out their risk management oversight responsibilities. As Part
265. SeeDodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(h), 124.
266. Dodd-Frank Act§ 165(h) (3) (C).
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II explains, the court's opinion in Citigroup reflects the possibility
that plaintiffs may use derivative suits to hold directors accountable
for risk management failures. The Citigroup opinion explains that
directors have an obligation to establish adequate risk manage-
ment systems and to monitor these systems in good faith. Evidence
of persisting "red flags," may signal that these systems are ineffec-
tive and trigger the board's oversight duty.67
When adopting the evidentiary standards for determining what
constitutes "red flags" in oversight claims, state authorities may en-
hance risk management oversight obligations that acknowledge the
influence of cognitive biases and structural dynamics. Adopting a
rigorous risk management standard may run contrary to the theory
of the business judgment rule discussed in Part II; however, the
critical role of risk management oversight, particularly in the busi-
ness model of systemically significant financial institutions, justifies
heightened liability standards in fiduciary oversight cases. Inter-
preting fiduciary obligations to have enforceable consequences if
directors fail to consider the architecture of risk management sys-
tems carefully and to monitor risks actively is consistent with the
courts' application of fiduciary obligations under Caremark and its
progeny.
3. Self-Regulatory Organizations
As Part III explained, SROs may enhance risk management over-
sight to account for cognitive biases and structural dynamics
through the regulatory framework of their listing criteria and best
practices requirements. Many of the largest and most sophisticated
financial institutions that suffered significant distress during the
recent financial crisis and ultimately received TARP funds are
companies whose securities are publicly traded on national securi-
ties exchanges. The exchanges, as SROs, have the authority to
adopt risk governance obligations for their members. With increas-
ing frequency, and, based on federal mandates under both the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the Dodd-Frank Act, SROs have
implemented rules affecting principles of corporate governance.
SOX, for example, directs SROs to impose corporate governance
requirements obligating exchange members to form audit commit-
tees and appoint independent directors to specific board
267. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 121.
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committees.w As Part III explained, the Dodd-Frank Act similarly
directs SROs to appoint only independent directors to compensa-
tion committees and imposes additional committee composition
obligations. While these structural and composition reforms may
mitigate cognitive biases and structural dynamics, SROs often have
greater knowledge and understanding of financial market risks and
can act more aggressively to adopt risk management oversight
rules.
SROs also often lead regulatory authorities in introducing re-
forms that reflect an understanding of cognitive biases and
structural dynamics. SROs are more agile and can adapt to con-
cerns regarding internal board dynamics. In addition, the
collaboration between SROs and industry trade organizations facil-
itates the development of industry specific knowledge and
expertise. In much less time than would be required for the SEC or
the Federal Reserve to engage in a rule-making process or to im-
plement standards for a risk management committee, SROs may,
for example, require the listed companies or specific groups of
listed companies to adopt the COSO framework or a similar com-
prehensive ERM oversight program.
4. Contractual Governance
Finally, the relationship between the shareholders and directors
and officers of a corporation is, at its core, a contractual relation-
ship. Adjusting the corporate charter, which is the contractual
agreement that establishes the relationship between executives and
directors and shareholders, may offer an efficient mechanism to im-
plement heightened risk management oversight. The challenges of
collective action and shareholder apathy typically limit shareholders'
ability to successfully influence corporate governance; thus, it may
be particularly difficult to amend the company's charter. If share-
holders are able to muster the momentum necessary to amend the
corporate charter, they should seek to impose specific risk manage-
ment duties on the board through the guidelines or charter of a risk
management committee.
268. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need to Reconcile Government Regu-
lation with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1692, 1702 (2011) ("Indeed, corporate
governance reforms under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) essentially required pub-
lic companies to maintain independent audit committees, which enhanced that committee's
role in the corporate governance landscape."); Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independ-
ence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 453 (2008) ("Under SOX, the audit committee must consist entirely
of independent directors, who in order to qualify cannot accept 'any consulting, advisory, or
other compensatory fee' from the company on whose board they sit.").
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As discussed in Part III, the Dodd-Frank Act introduces share-
holder-centric mechanisms to enhance shareholders' ability to
influence compensation and other governance issues. Through the
guidelines of a risk management committee charter, shareholders
may gain a more robust voice in the debate regarding board over-
sight of risk management. The risk management committee
charter may demand greater transparency regarding risk man-
agement decisions. Notwithstanding the fact that federal
regulation creates periodic reporting requirements, risk man-
agement committees may adopt charter provisions that require
the risk management committees to issue more frequent reports
regarding risk management strategies and to consult with inde-
pendent risk management experts.
In addition, shareholders would benefit from further reforms of
compensation committee policies that offer incentive-based com-
pensation. While the Dodd-Frank Act does create incentive-based
compensation disclosure requirements, the legislation does not
propose solutions that militate against abuse of incentive-based
compensation arrangements. Through increased influence, share-
holders may campaign for compensation committees to tie
incentive-based awards to risk-adjusted returns rather than merely
the performance of the corporation's equity securities or allow
awards to vest over a longer period.
Addressing the cognitive biases and structural dynamics that im-
pede effective risk management presents a challenge that is not
easily resolved by any one or even all of these proposed solutions.
In part, the goal is difficult because there is still a great deal to
learn as behavioral economists continue to explore the sources and
remedies that effectively address cognitive biases. Moreover, each of
the proposed solutions creates costs for regulators, self-regulatory
organizations, and regulated businesses. In certain instances, the
proposed solutions encourage regulators to act outside of their areas
of expertise and therefore may not lead to the desired risk-reducing
outcomes.
However, the benefits of imposing these reforms significantly
outweigh the costs. The influence of cognitive biases and structural
dynamics on board decisions undermines the efficiency of allowing
boards to engage in group decision-making. In the context of risk
management decisions, the effects of these inefficiencies may be
detrimental to individual businesses if they lead to ERM failures.
Moreover, the negative impacts across an industry, particularly the
financial services industry, may have devastating consequences for
domestic and global financial markets.
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CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that the regulation of policies that
businesses or enterprises adopt to identify, monitor, and mitigate
risks, comprises a critical element in any effective strategy to re-
duce systemic risk. The innovative development of quantitative
methods for measuring risk exposure and structured finance
products designed to mitigate risk exposure revolutionized the ap-
plication of risk management theories. While an increasing
number of risk mitigating methods have emerged, financial institu-
tions now almost uniformly employ quantitative financial models
to measure risk exposure. In addition, financial institutions' use of
derivatives for hedging or mitigating risk exposure has increased
exponentially in the last two decades. However, notwithstanding
the identified benefits of risk mitigating methods, systemically sig-
nificant financial institutions' use of these methods have created
grave concerns. These risk measuring and risk mitigating methods
have, ironically, concentrated systemic risk and contributed to sig-
nificant losses during the recent financial crisis.
Systemically significant financial institutions suffered staggering
losses due to failures related to these internal risk management
policies. The circumstances created by the crisis illustrate the im-
portance of regulating ERM. The prevailing view regarding
reforms focuses narrowly on systemic risk and overlooks the valua-
ble benefits engendered by adopting effective risk management
reforms. When we consider the costs of risk management failures,
it becomes clear that adopting a myopic view of risk regulation may
prove costly.
State fiduciary obligations generally introduce effective
mechanisms designed to balance directors' and officers' authority
over internal corporate affairs with their accountability for such
decisions. However, this Article reveals that state law has so narrowly
interpreted the fiduciary duties of directors that only intentional or
egregious conduct is actionable. As illustrated by a wave of derivative
litigation alleging that directors should be held accountable for
massive financial losses during the recent financial crisis, liability
standards for ERM oversight is unclear. The low threshold for
escaping fiduciary liability under state law permits private businesses
to shift the negative consequences, or negative externalities, of their
risk-taking activities to the public. When the costs of these negative
externalities required the government to distribute over $700 billion
to stabilize the economy, federal regulators promptly intervened.
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Comprised of disclosure requirements and, in more recent
years, corporate governance reforms, federal securities regulation
endeavors to address ERM failures. The recently adopted Dodd-
Frank Act introduces reforms that acknowledge directors' and ex-
ecutives' incentives to take undesirable risks with a company's
assets. In the end, however, federal approaches to ERM oversight
focus too narrowly on disclosure, executive compensation, and in-
dependent directors' participation on the board. While federal
reforms may curtail some less-desirable behavior, a more effective
approach remains underexplored.
This Article suggests that a comprehensive approach to risk man-
agement regulation is necessary to reduce ERM failures and the role
of ERM failures in creating systemic risk. Drawing on the strengths
of each of the four spheres of authority that influence corporate
governance-state authorities, federal authorities, self-regulatory
agencies, and private contractual arrangements-this Article offers a
more effective solution to ERM concerns. By addressing the cogni-
tive biases and structural dynamics that impede effective risk
management, each sphere of regulatory authority may implement
more appropriate regulatory reforms.
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